The Mobility Transition Model (MoTMo) is a large scale agent-based model to simulate the private mobility demand in Germany until 2035. Here, we publish a very much reduced version of this model (R-MoTMo) which is designed to demonstrate the basic modelling ideas; the aim is by abstracting from the (empirical, technological, geographical, etc.) details to examine the feed-backs of individual decisions on the socio-technical system.

This is an implementation of an agent based model for the evolution of ethnocentrism. While based off a model published by Hammond and Axelrod (2006), the code has been modified to allow for a more fine-grained analysis of evolutionary dynamics.

Country-by-Country Reporting and Automatic Exchange of Information have recently been implemented in European Union (EU) countries. These international tax reforms increase tax compliance in the short term. In the long run, however, taxpayers will continue looking abroad to avoid taxation and, countries, looking for additional revenues, will provide opportunities. As a result, tax competition intensifies and the initial increase in compliance could reverse. To avoid international tax reforms being counteracted by tax competition, this paper suggests bilateral responsive regulation to maximize compliance. This implies that countries would use different tax policy instruments toward other countries, including tax and secrecy havens.

To assess the effectiveness of fully or partially enforce tax policies, this agent based model has been ran many times under different enforcement rules, which influence the perceived enforced- and voluntary compliance, as the slippery-slope model prescribes. Based on the dynamics of this perception and the extent to which agents influence each other, the annual amounts of tax evasion, tax avoidance and taxes paid are calculated over longer periods of time.

The agent-based simulation finds that a differentiated policy response could increase tax compliance by 6.54 percent, which translates into an annual increase of €105 billion in EU tax revenues on income, profits, and capital gains. Corporate income tax revenues in France, Spain, and the UK alone would already account for €35 billion.

The original Ache model is used to explore different distributions of resources on the landscape and it’s effect on optimal strategies of the camps on hunting and camp movement.

In this Repast model the ‘Consumat’ cognitive framework is applied to an ABM of the Dutch car market. Different policy scenarios can be selected or created to examine their effect on the diffusion of EVs.

The HERB model simulates the retrofit behavior of homeowners in a neighborhood. The model initially parameterizes a neighborhood and households with technical factors such as energy standard, the availability of subsidies, and neighbors’ retrofit activity. Then, these factors are translated into psychological variables such as perceived comfort gain, worry about affording the retrofit, and perceiving the current energy standard of the home as wasteful. These psychological variables moderate the transition between four different stages of deciding to retrofit, as suggested by a behavioral model specific to household energy retrofitting identified based on a large population survey in Norway. The transition between all stages eventually leads to retrofitting, which affects both the household’s technical factors and friends and neighbors, bringing the model “full circle”. The model assumes that the energy standard of the buildings deteriorates over time, forcing households to retrofit regularly to maintain a certain energy standard.

Because experiment datafiles are about 15GB, they are available at https://doi.org/10.18710/XOSAMD

Model that illustrates the use of the GAMA advanced driving skill through a case study concerning the evacuation of the city of Rouen (France).

Subjective biases and errors systematically affect market equilibria, whether at the population level or in bilateral trading. Here, we consider the possibility that an agent engaged in bilateral trading is mistaken about her own valuation of the good she expects to trade, that has not been explicitly incorporated into the existing bilateral trade literature. Although it may sound paradoxical that a subjective private valuation is something an agent can be mistaken about, as it is up to her to fix it, we consider the case in which that agent, seller or buyer, consciously or not, given the structure of a market, a type of good, and a temporary lack of information, may arrive at an erroneous valuation. The typical context through which this possibility may arise is in relation with so-called experience goods, which are sold while all their intrinsic qualities are still unknown (such as untasted bottled fine wines). We model this “private misvaluation” phenomenon in our study. The agents may also be mistaken about how their exchange counterparties are themselves mistaken. Formally, they attribute a certain margin of error to the other agent, which can differ from the actual way that another agent misvalues the good under consideration. This can constitute the source of a second-order misvaluation. We model different attitudes and situations in which agents face unexpected signals from their counterparties and the manner and extent to which they revise their initial beliefs. We analyse and simulate numerically the consequences of first-order and second-order misvaluation on market equilibria.

Norms@Risk ABM aim is to develop an explanation for the conditions under which people jointly take action to prevent disasters from happening, e.g. impacts from climate crisis, pandemic. The aim of the Norms@Risk work is to explore understudied dynamics between risk, social norms and cooperative behaviour and their role in overcoming collective threats. More specifically, Norms@Risk seeks to refine existing theory on cooperation by unpacking the role of collective risk interacting with social norms in ‘Collective Risk Social Dilemmas’*.

This simulation study takes on the next scientific iteration after a series of behavioural experiments. With the model we target to refine existing theory by capturing the heterogeneity in contributions that existing theories cannot fully explain as the behavioural responses are assumed to be more homogenous, particularly diversity regarding sensitivity to risk and norms.

*Collective Risk Social Dilemmas reflect a special type of social dilemma, unlike typical public goods, the collective risk dilemma involves individual contribution not to realise a gain, but to avoid a collective loss.

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This is an agent-based model of peer review built on the following three entities: papers, scientists and conferences. The model has been implemented on a BDI platform (Jason) that allows to perform both parameter and mechanism exploration.