This model allows simulating the impacts of floods on a population. Floods are described by their intensity (flood height) and date of occurrence. Households are more or less severely hit by floods according to their geographical situation. Impacts are measured in terms of reductions in household wealth. Households may take up protection measures against floods, depending on their individual characteristics, a social network and information campaigns. If such measures are taken, flood impacts (wealth reduction) are less severe. Information campaigns increase the probability that households adopt protection measures. Two types of information campaigns are modeled: top-down policies which are the same for all households, people-centered policies, which adapt to the individual characteristics of each household.

This work is a java implementation of a study of the viability of a population submitted to floods. The population derives some benefit from living in a certain environment. However, in this environment, floods can occur and cause damage. An individual protection measure can be adopted by those who wish and have the means to do so. The protection measure reduces the damage in case of a flood. However, the effectiveness of this measure deteriorates over time. Individual motivation to adopt this measure is boosted by the occurrence of a flood. Moreover, the public authorities can encourage the population to adopt this measure by carrying out information campaigns, but this comes at a cost. People’s decisions are modelled based on the Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers1975, Rogers 1997, Maddux1983) arguing that the motivation to protect themselves depends on their perception of risk, their capacity to cope with risk and their socio-demographic characteristics.
While the control designing proper informations campaigns to remain viable every time is computed in the work presented in https://www.comses.net/codebases/e5c17b1f-0121-4461-9ae2-919b6fe27cc4/releases/1.0.0/, the aim of the present work is to produce maps of probable viability in case the serie of upcoming floods is unknown as well as much of the parameters for the population dynamics. These maps are bi-dimensional, based on the value of known parameters: the current average wealth of the population and their actual or possible future annual revenues.

This model computes the guaranteed viability kernel of a model describing the evolution of a population submitted to successive floods.
The population is described by its wealth and its adaptation rate to floods, the control are information campaigns that have a cost but increase the adaptation rate and the expected successive floods belong to given set defined by the maximal high and the minimal time between two floods.

The model investigates the determinants of inter- and intra-urban inequality in contact with nature. We explore the plausibility of a social integration hypothesis - whereby the primary factor in decisions to visit Urban Green Spaces (UGS) is an assessment of who else is likely to be using the space at the same time, and the assessment runs predominantly along class lines. The model reproduces four cities in Scotland and shows the conditions under which the mechanisms theorised are sufficient to reproduce observed inequalities in UGS usage.

Large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) threaten smallholder livelihoods globally. Despite more than a decade of research on the LSLA phenomenon, it remains a challenge to identify governance conditions that may foster beneficial outcomes for both smallholders and investors. One potentially promising strategy toward this end is contract farming (CF), which more directly involves smallholder households in commodity production than conditions of acquisition and displacement.

To improve understanding of how CF may mediate the outcomes of LSLAs, we developed an agent-based model of smallholder livelihoods, which we used as a virtual laboratory to experiment on a range of hypothetical LSLA and CF implementation scenarios.

The model represents a community of smallholder households in a mixed crop-livestock system. Each agent farms their own land and manages a herd of livestock. Agents can also engage in off-farm employment, for which they earn a fixed wage and compete for a limited number of jobs. The principal model outputs include measures of household food security (representing access to a single, staple food crop) and agricultural production (of a single, staple food crop).

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This model is an agent-based simulation written in Python 2.7, which simulates the cost of social care in an ageing UK population. The simulation incorporates processes of population change which affect the demand for and supply of social care, including health status, partnership formation, fertility and mortality. Fertility and mortality rates are drawn from UK population data, then projected forward to 2050 using the methods developed by Lee and Carter 1992.

The model demonstrates that rising life expectancy combined with lower birthrates leads to growing social care costs across the population. More surprisingly, the model shows that the oft-proposed intervention of raising the retirement age has limited utility; some reductions in costs are attained initially, but these reductions taper off beyond age 70. Subsequent work has enhanced and extended this model by adding more detail to agent behaviours and familial relationships.

The version of the model provided here produces outputs in a format compatible with the GEM-SA uncertainty quantification software by Kennedy and O’Hagan. This allows sensitivity analyses to be performed using Gaussian Process Emulation.

This paper tries to shed some light on the mutual influence of citizen behaviour and the spread of a virus in an epidemic. While the spread of a virus from infectious to susceptible persons and the outbreak of an infection leading to more or less severe illness and, finally, to recovery and immunity or death has been modelled with different kinds of models in the past, the influence of certain behaviours to keep the epidemic low and to follow recommendations of others to apply these behaviours has rarely been modelled. The model introduced here uses a theory of the effect of norm invocations among persons to find out the effect of spreading norms interacts with the progress of an epidemic. Results show that norm invocations matter. The model replicates the histories of the COVID-19 epidemic in various region, including “second waves”, and shows that the calculation of the reproduction numbers from current reported infections usually overestimates the “real” but in practice unobservable reproduction number.

A curious aspect of the Covid-19 pandemic is the clustering of outbreaks. Evidence suggests that 80\% of people who contract the virus are infected by only 19% of infected individuals, and that the majority of infected individuals faile to infect another person. Thus, the dispersion of a contagion, $k$, may be of more use in understanding the spread of Covid-19 than the reproduction number, R0.

The Virus Transmission with Super-spreaders model, written in NetLogo, is an adaptation of the canonical Virus Transmission on a Network model and allows the exploration of various mitigation protocols such as testing and quarantines with both homogenous transmission and heterogenous transmission.

The model consists of a population of individuals arranged in a network, where both population and network degree are tunable. At the start of the simulation, a subset of the population is initially infected. As the model runs, infected individuals will infect neighboring susceptible individuals according to either homogenous or heterogenous transmission, where heterogenous transmission models super-spreaders. In this case, k is described as the percentage of super-spreaders in the population and the differing transmission rates for super-spreaders and non super-spreaders. Infected individuals either recover, at which point they become resistant to infection, or die. Testing regimes cause discovered infected individuals to quarantine for a period of time.

The Price Evolution with Expectations model provides the opportunity to explore the question of non-equilibrium market dynamics, and how and under which conditions an economic system converges to the classically defined economic equilibrium. To accomplish this, we bring together two points of view of the economy; the classical perspective of general equilibrium theory and an evolutionary perspective, in which the current development of the economic system determines the possibilities for further evolution.

The Price Evolution with Expectations model consists of a representative firm producing no profit but producing a single good, which we call sugar, and a representative household which provides labour to the firm and purchases sugar.The model explores the evolutionary dynamics whereby the firm does not initially know the household demand but eventually this demand and thus the correct price for sugar given the household’s optimal labour.

The model can be run in one of two ways; the first does not include money and the second uses money such that the firm and/or the household have an endowment that can be spent or saved. In either case, the household has preferences for leisure and consumption and a demand function relating sugar and price, and the firm has a production function and learns the household demand over a set number of time steps using either an endogenous or exogenous learning algorithm. The resulting equilibria, or fixed points of the system, may or may not match the classical economic equilibrium.

The model is based on the influence function of the Leviathan model (Deffuant, Carletti, Huet 2013 and Huet and Deffuant 2017). We aim at better explaining some patterns generated by this model, using a derived mathematical approximation of the evolution of the opinions averaged.

We consider agents having an opinion/esteem about each other and about themselves. During dyadic meetings, agents change their respective opinion about each other, and possibly about other agents they gossip about, with a noisy perception of the opinions of their interlocutor. Highly valued agents are more influential in such encounters.

We show that the inequality of reputations among agents have a negative effect on the opinions about the agents of low status.The mathematical analysis of the opinion dynamic shows that the lower the status of the agent, the more detrimental the interactions are for the opinions about this agent, especially when gossip is activated, while the interactions always tend to increase the opinions about agents of high status.