Computational Model Library

Port of Mars simplified

Marco Janssen | Published Tue Jan 14 17:02:08 2020

This is a simulation model to explore possible outcomes of the Port of Mars cardgame. Port of Mars is a resource allocation game examining how people navigate conflicts between individual goals and common interests relative to shared resources. The game involves five players, each of whom must decide how much of their time and effort to invest in maintaining public infrastructure and renewing shared resources and how much to expend in pursuit of their individual goals. In the game, “Upkeep” is a number that represents the physical health of the community. This number begins at 100 and goes down by twenty-five points each round, representing resource consumption and wear and tear on infrastructure. If that number reaches zero, the community collapses and everyone dies.

Cultural Group Selection of Sustainable Institutions

Timothy Waring Sandra H Goff Paul Smaldino | Published Wed Jun 10 17:38:06 2015 | Last modified Tue Aug 4 14:14:05 2015

We develop a spatial, evolutionary model of the endogenous formation and dissolution of groups using a renewable common pool resource. We use this foundation to measure the evolutionary pressures at different organizational levels.

Adoption of a new regulation

Marco Janssen | Published Sat Jan 26 23:58:54 2019

A group of agents share a resource and agents will become sufficiently motivated to adopt a rule to constraint their freedom if they experience resource scarcity and developed mutual trust relationships.

This model simulates how collective self-organisation among individuals that manage irrigation resource collectively.

This is an agent-based model that simulates the structural evolution in food supply chain.

The purpose of the model is to examine whether and how mobile pastoralists are able to achieve an Ideal Free Distribution (IFD).

Interactions between organizations and social networks in common-pool resource governance

Phesi Project | Published Mon Oct 29 21:14:47 2012 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:37 2013

Explores how social networks affect implementation of institutional rules in a common pool resource.

Peer reviewed Evolution of Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas

Marco Janssen Nathan Rollins | Published Fri Aug 20 18:41:16 2010 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013

This model can be used to explore under which conditions agents behave as observed in field experiments on irrigation games.

CPNorm

Ruth Meyer | Published Sun Jun 4 14:19:17 2017 | Last modified Tue Jun 13 12:25:12 2017

CPNorm is a model of a community of harvesters using a common pool resource where adhering to the optimal extraction level has become a social norm. The model can be used to explore the robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons.

The Groundwater Commons Game

Juan Carlos Castilla-Rho Rodrigo Rojas | Published Thu May 11 13:04:53 2017 | Last modified Sat Sep 16 03:46:39 2017

The Groundwater Commons Game synthesises and extends existing work on human cooperation and collective action, to elucidate possible determinants and pathways to regulatory compliance in groundwater systems globally.

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