MicroAnts 2.5 is a general-purpose agent-based model designed as a flexible workhorse for simulating ecological and evolutionary dynamics in artificial populations, as well as, potentially, the emergence of political institutions and economic regimes. It builds on and extends Stephen Wright’s original MicroAnts 2.0 by introducing configurable predators, inequality tracking, and other options.
Ant agents are of two tyes/casts and controlled by 16-bit chromosomes encoding traits such as vision, movement, mating thresholds, sensing, and combat strength. Predators (anteaters) operate in static, random, or targeted predatory modes. Ants reproduce, mutate, cooperate, fight, and die based on their traits and interactions. Environmental pressures (poison and predators) and social dynamics (sharing, mating, combat) drive emergent behavior across red and black ant populations.
The model supports insertion of custom agents at runtime, configurable mutation/inversion rates, and exports detailed statistics, including inequality metrics (e.g., Gini coefficients), trait frequencies, predator kills, and lineage data. Intended for rapid testing and educational experimentation, MicroAnts 2.5 serves as a modular base for more complex ecological and social simulations.

This agent-based model investigates scapegoating as a social mechanism of crisis management. Inspired by René Girard’s mimetic theory, it simulates how individual tension accumulates and spreads across a small-world network. When tension exceeds certain thresholds, leaders emerge and accuse marginalized agents, who may attempt to transfer blame to substitutes. If scapegoating occurs, collective tension decreases, but victims become isolated while leaders consolidate temporary authority. This simulation provides a conceptual and methodological framework for exploring how collective blame, crisis contagion, and leadership paradoxes emerge in complex networks. It can also be extended with empirical data, such as social media dynamics of online harassment and virtual lynching, offering potential applications for both theoretical research and practical crisis monitoring.

A model to investigate the Evolution of Conditional Cooperation in a Spatial Public Goods Game. We consider two conditional cooperation strategies: one based on thresholds (Battu & Srinivasan, 2020) and another based on independent decisions for each number of cooperating neighbors. We examine the effects of productivity and conditional cooperation criteria on the trajectory of cooperation. Cooperation is evolving with no need for additional mechanisms apart from spatial structure when agents follow conditional strategies. We confirm the positive influence of productivity and cluster formation on the evolution of cooperation in spatial models. Results are robust for the two types of conditional cooperation strategies.

Schelling famously proposed an extremely simple but highly illustrative social mechanism to understand how strong ethnic segregation could arise in a world where individuals do not necessarily want it. Schelling’s simple computational model is the starting point for our extensions in which we build upon Wilensky’s original NetLogo implementation of this model. Our two NetLogo models can be best studied while reading our chapter “Agent-based Computational Models” (Flache and de Matos Fernandes, 2021). In the chapter, we propose 10 best practices to elucidate how agent-based models are a unique method for providing and analyzing formally precise, and empirically plausible mechanistic explanations of puzzling social phenomena, such as segregation, in the social world. Our chapter addresses in particular analytical sociologists who are new to ABMs.

In the first model (SegregationExtended), we build on Wilensky’s implementation of Schelling’s model which is available in NetLogo library (Wilensky, 1997). We considerably extend this model, allowing in particular to include larger neighborhoods and a population with four groups roughly resembling the ethnic composition of a contemporary large U.S. city. Further features added concern the possibility to include random noise, and the addition of a number of new outcome measures tuned to highlight macro-level implications of the segregation dynamics for different groups in the agent society.

In SegregationDiscreteChoice, we further modify the model incorporating in particular three new features: 1) heterogeneous preferences roughly based on empirical research categorizing agents into low, medium, and highly tolerant within each of the ethnic subgroups of the population, 2) we drop global thresholds (%-similar-wanted) and introduce instead a continuous individual-level single-peaked preference function for agents’ ideal neighborhood composition, and 3) we use a discrete choice model according to which agents probabilistically decide whether to move to a vacant spot or stay in the current spot by comparing the attractiveness of both locations based on the individual preference functions.

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The model is an agent-based artificial stock market where investors connect in a dynamic network. The network is dynamic in the sense that the investors, at specified intervals, decide whether to keep their current adviser (those investors they receive trading advise from). The investors also gain information from a private source and share public information about the risky asset. Investors have different tendencies to follow the different information sources, consider differing amounts of history, and have different thresholds for investing.

We use a threshold model to drive our simulated network analysis testing public support for candidates in invisible primaries. We assign voter thresholds for candidates and vary number of voters, attachment to candidates and decay. Results of the algorithm show effects of size of lead, attachment and size of decay.

The Groundwater Commons Game synthesises and extends existing work on human cooperation and collective action, to elucidate possible determinants and pathways to regulatory compliance in groundwater systems globally.

This NetLogo model implements the Walk Away strategy in a spatial public goods game, where individuals have the ability to leave groups with insufficient levels of cooperation.

Due to teacher requests to represent changes in atomic radius, we developed a visualization of the first 36 elements in Netlogo

An agent-based model is used to simulate legislators’ behavior under secret voting rules, as influenced by the power of the accused politician, the composition of the voting body, and the publicity of the accusations.