This is the R code of the mathematical model used for verification. This code corresponds to equations 1-9, 15-53, 58-62, 69-70, and 72-75 given in the paper “A Mathematical Model of The Beer Game”.

This is the R code of the mathematical model that includes the decision making formulations for artificial agents. This code corresponds to equations 1-70 given in the paper “A Mathematical Model of The Beer Game”.

A simple model of random encounters of materials that produces distributions as found in the archaeological record.

We provide an agent-based model of collective action, informed by Granovetter (1978) and its replication model by Siegel (2009). We use the model to examine the role of ICTs in collective action under different cultural and political contexts.

The provided source code is the result of our efforts in replicating Epstein’s Demographic Prisoner’s Dilemma. The simulation model is written in Repast/J 3.1.

How can a strictly egalitarian social system give way to a stratified society if all of its members punish each other for any type of selfish behavior? This model examines the role of prestige bias in constant and variable environments on the development of hierarchies of wealth.

This is a replication of the Pumpa model that simulates the Pumpa Irrigation System in Nepal (Cifdaloz et al., 2010).

This is a replication model of the matching problem including the mate search problem, which is the generalization of a traditional optimization problem.

This model is a replication of that described by Peterson (2002) and illustrates the ‘spread’ feedback loop type described in Millington (2013).

Agents co-operate or defect towards other agents in a prisoner’s dilemma, with strategy choice depending on whether agents share tags or are kin in different social structures.