this agent-based model explores the dynamics of volunteer participation in urban community gardens, by combining behavioral theory and institutional theory

This model examines how financial and social top-down interventions interplay with the internal self-organizing dynamics of a fishing community. The aim is to transform from hierarchical fishbuyer-fisher relationship into fishing cooperatives.

Implementation of Milbrath’s (1965) model of political participation. Individual participation is determined by stimuli from the political environment, interpersonal interaction, as well as individual characteristics.

We develop a spatial, evolutionary model of the endogenous formation and dissolution of groups using a renewable common pool resource. We use this foundation to measure the evolutionary pressures at different organizational levels.

We establish a double-layer network for China’s financial system, consisting of an interbank lending network and a cross-shareholding network. The loss of diffusion in an interbank lending channel independently, a cross-shareholding channel independently and a double-layer contagion channel after one of the financial institutions goes bankrupt with an initial shock are simulated to explore the nonlinear evolution mechanism of financial risk and impact factors of financial systemic risk in China.

This Netlogo replication of Kollman, K., J.H. Miller and S.E. Page (1997) Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model, American Economic Review 87(5): 977-992. The model consists of of citizens who can vote for partie and move to other jurisdictions if they expect their preferences are better served. Parties adjust their positions to increase their share in the elections.

This model builds on another model in this library (“diffusion of culture”).

I model a forest and a community of loggers. Agents follow different kinds of rules in order to log. I compare the impact of endogenous and of exogenous institutions on the state of the forest and on the profit of the users, representing different scenarios of participatory conservation projects.

This model represents informal information transmission networks among medieval Genoese investors used to inform each other about cheating merchants they employed as part of long-distance trade operations.

The model represents an archetypical fishery in a co-evolutionary social-ecological environment, capturing different dimensions of trust between fishers and fish buyers for the establishment and persistence of self-governance arrangements.