Computational Model Library

Displaying 10 of 16 results irrigation clear filters

The ABM model is designed to model the adaptability of farmers in DTIM. This model includes two groups of farmers and local government admins agents. Farmers with different levels, with low WP of DTIM, are looking for economic benefits and reduced irrigation and production costs. Meanwhile, the government is looking for strategic goals to maintain water resources’ sustainability. The local government admins employ incentives (subsidies in this study) to encourage farmers to DTIM. In addition, it is used as a tool for supervision and training farmers’ performance. Farmers are currently harvesting water resources with irrigation systems and different levels of technology, and they intend to provide short-term benefits. Farmers adjust the existing approach based on their knowledge of the importance of DTIM and propensity to increase WP and cost-benefit evaluation. DTIM has an initial implementation fee. Every farmer can increase WP by using government subsidies. If none of the farmers create optimal use of water resources, access to water resources will be threatened in the long term. This is considered a hypothetical cost for farmers who do not participate in DTIM. With DTIM, considering that local government admins’ facilities cover an essential part of implementation costs, farmers may think of profiting from local government admins’ facilities by selling that equipment, especially if the farmers in the following conditions may consider selling their developed irrigation equipment. In this case, the technology of their irrigation system will return to the state before development.
- When the threshold of farmers’ propensity to DTIM is low (for example, in the conditions of scarcity of access to sufficient training about the new irrigation system or its role in reducing the cost and sustainability of water resources)
- When the share of government subsidy is high, and as a result, the profit from the sale of equipment is attractive, especially in conditions of inflation.
- Finally, farmers’ honesty threshold should be reduced based on the positive experience of profit-seeking and deception among neighbors.
Increasing the share of government subsidies can encourage farmers to earn profits. Therefore, the government can help increase farmers’ profits by considering the assessment teams at different levels with DTIM training . local government admins evaluations monitor the behavior of farmers. If farmers sell their improved irrigation system for profit, they may be deprived of some local government admins’ services and the possibility of receiving subsidies again. Assessments The local government admins can increase farmers’ honesty. Next, the ABM model evaluates local government admins policies to achieve a suitable framework for water resources management in the Miandoab region.

This model is supporting the serious game RÁC (“waste” in Vietnamese), dedicated to foster discussion about solid waste management in a Vietnamese commune in the Bắc Hưng Hải irrigation system.
The model is replicating waste circulation and environmental impact in four fictive villages. During the game, the players take actions and see how their decisions have an impact on the model.
This model was implemented using the GAMA platform, using gaml language.

WATER REUSE ADOPTION BY FARMERS (WRAF)

Farshid Shoushtarian | Published Tuesday, September 27, 2022

Agriculture is the largest water-consuming sector worldwide, responsible for almost 70% of the world’s total freshwater consumption. Agricultural water reuse is one of the most sustainable and reliable methods to alleviate water shortages worldwide. However, the dynamics of agricultural water reuse adoption by farmers and its impacts on local water resources are still unknown to the scientific community, according to the literature. Therefore, the primary purpose of the WRAF model is to investigate the micro-level dynamics of agricultural water reuse adoption by farmers and its impacts on local water resources. The WRAF was developed using agent-based modeling as an exploratory tool for scenario analysis. The model was specifically designed for researchers and water resources decision-makers, especially those interested in natural resources management and water reuse.
WRAF simulates a virtual agricultural area in which several autonomous farms operate. It also simulates these farms’ water consumption dynamics. The developed model includes two types of agents: farmers and wastewater treatment plants. In general, farmer agents are the main water-consuming agents, and wastewater treatment plant agents are recycled water providers in the WRAF model. Dynamic simulation of agricultural water supply and demand in the area allows the user to observe the results of various irrigation water management scenarios, including recycled water. The models also enable the user to apply multiple climate change scenarios, including normal, moderate drought, severe drought, and wet weather conditions.

WatASit

Bastien RICHARD Bastien Richard Bruno Bonté Olivier Barreteau Isabelle Braud | Published Friday, December 20, 2019 | Last modified Wednesday, October 28, 2020

WatASit is an agent-based model implemented in the CORMAS plateform. The model is developped to simulate irrigation situations at the operational level during a collective irrigation campaign.

Samambaia Basin - Hydro-ABM

Pedro Phelipe Gonçalves Porto | Published Sunday, April 07, 2019 | Last modified Monday, May 06, 2019

This model is a tool to support water management on Samambaia Basin. On it you can explore different scenarios of policy, management and externalities that could influence the water uses. (Scenarios already tested include less rain and payment on water use)

Effect of communication in irrigation games

Marco Janssen Jacopo Baggio | Published Wednesday, January 14, 2015 | Last modified Wednesday, August 09, 2017

The model includes different formulations how agents make decisions in irrigation games and this is compared with empirical data. The aim is to test different theoretical models, especially explaining effect of communication.

This model simulates how collective self-organisation among individuals that manage irrigation resource collectively.

Peer reviewed Evolution of Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas

Marco Janssen Nathan Rollins | Published Friday, August 20, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This model can be used to explore under which conditions agents behave as observed in field experiments on irrigation games.

Irrigation game

Marco Janssen | Published Monday, July 23, 2012 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

Irrigation game calibrated on experimental data

Peer reviewed Pumpa irrigation model

Irene Perez Ibarra Marco Janssen | Published Wednesday, January 09, 2013 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This is a replication of the Pumpa model that simulates the Pumpa Irrigation System in Nepal (Cifdaloz et al., 2010).

Displaying 10 of 16 results irrigation clear filters

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