Agents can influence each other if they are close enough in knowledge. The probability to convince with good knowledge and number of agents have an impact on the dissemination of knowledge.

The purpose of this model is to explore the influence of integrating individuals’ behavioral dynamics in an agent-based model of COVID-19, on the dynamics of disease transmission. The model is an agent-based extention of an established large-scale Individual-based model called STRIDE. Four risk factors determine the individual’s perception of the risk and how they behave accordingly. It is assumed that individuals with higher levels of risk perception adopt higher levels of contact reduction in their daily routines. Individuals can assign different weights to any of the four different risk factors, i.e., the modeler can model different populations and explore how the transmission dynamics vary among them.

Butterflies (turtles) goes through metamorphism and moves to corresponding patches each season of the year. The number of years and seasons are monitored.

The code for the paper “Social norms and the dominance of Low-doers”

An individual-based model to evaluate, whether time delays in plant responses to insect herbivory can be beneficial for the plant.

This is a multi-patch meta-population ecological model. It intended as a test-bed in which to test the impact of humans with different kinds of social structure.

This is an opinion dynamics model which extends the model found in (Martins 2009). The previous model had an unshared uncertainty assumption in agent-to-agent interaction this model relaxes that assumption. The model only supports a fully connect network where every agent has an equal likelihood of interacting with every other agent at any given time step. The model is highly modular so different social network paradigm can easier be implemented.

UPDATE in V1.1.0: missing input data files added; relative paths to input data files changed to “../data/FILENAME”

A model that allows for representing key theories of Roman amphora reuse, to explore the differences in the distribution of amphorae, re-used amphorae and their contents.

This model generates simulated distributions of prime-use amphorae, primeuse contents (e.g. olive oil) and reused amphorae. These simulated distributions will differ between experiments depending on the experiment’s variable settings representing the tested theory: variations in the probability of reuse, the supply volume, the probability of reuse at ports. What we are interested in teasing out is what the effect is of each theory on the simulated amphora distributions.

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Subjective biases and errors systematically affect market equilibria, whether at the population level or in bilateral trading. Here, we consider the possibility that an agent engaged in bilateral trading is mistaken about her own valuation of the good she expects to trade, that has not been explicitly incorporated into the existing bilateral trade literature. Although it may sound paradoxical that a subjective private valuation is something an agent can be mistaken about, as it is up to her to fix it, we consider the case in which that agent, seller or buyer, consciously or not, given the structure of a market, a type of good, and a temporary lack of information, may arrive at an erroneous valuation. The typical context through which this possibility may arise is in relation with so-called experience goods, which are sold while all their intrinsic qualities are still unknown (such as untasted bottled fine wines). We model this “private misvaluation” phenomenon in our study. The agents may also be mistaken about how their exchange counterparties are themselves mistaken. Formally, they attribute a certain margin of error to the other agent, which can differ from the actual way that another agent misvalues the good under consideration. This can constitute the source of a second-order misvaluation. We model different attitudes and situations in which agents face unexpected signals from their counterparties and the manner and extent to which they revise their initial beliefs. We analyse and simulate numerically the consequences of first-order and second-order misvaluation on market equilibria.

The purpose of the model is to generate coalition structures of different glove games, using a specially designed algorithm. The coalition structures can be are later analyzed by comparing them to core partitions of the game used. Core partitions are coalition structures where no subset of players has an incentive to form a new coalition.

The algorithm used in this model is an advancement of the algorithm found in Collins & Frydenlund (2018). It was used used to generate the results in Vernon-Bido & Collins (2021).