This model is a minimal agent-based model (ABM) of green consumption and market tipping dynamics in a stylised two-firm economy. It is designed as an existence proof to illustrate how weak individual preferences, when combined with habit formation, social influence, and firm price adaptation, can generate non-linear transitions (tipping points) in market outcomes.

The economy consists of:
1) Two firms, each supplying a differentiated consumption bundle that differs in its fixed green share (one relatively greener, one less green).
2) Many households, each consuming a unit mass per period and allocating consumption between the two firms.

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Evolution of Sex is a NetLogo model that illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of sexual and asexual reproductive strategies. It seeks to demonstrate the answer to the question “Why do we have sex?”

This model implements a coupled opinion-mobility agent-based framework in NetLogo, extending Attraction-Repulsion Model (ARM) dynamics with endogenous migration in continuous 2D space.

Each agent has an opinion s in [0,1] and a spatial position (x,y). Agents interact locally within an interaction radius, with exposure-controlled interaction probability. Opinion updates follow ARM rules: attraction for small opinion distance and repulsion for large distance (tolerance threshold T). After social interaction, agents move according to a social-force mechanism that balances attraction to similar neighbors and avoidance of dissimilar neighbors, controlled by orientation bias (approaching goods vs leaving bads). The model also includes an optional exposure-mobility coupling setting.

Main outputs include polarization (P), spatial assortativity (Moran’s I), mixed-neighbor fraction (f_mix), and good-component count (N_g). The model is designed to study phase behavior of polarization and segregation under mobility and tolerance heterogeneity.

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In his 2003 book, Historical Dynamics (ch. 4), Turchin describes and briefly analyzes a spatial ABM of his metaethnic frontier theory, which is essentially a formalization of a theory by Ibn Khaldun in the 14th century. In the model, polities compete with neighboring polities and can absorb them into an empire. Groups possess “asabiya”, a measure of social solidarity and a sense of shared purpose. Regions that share borders with other groups will have increased asabiya do to salient us vs. them competition. High asabiya enhances the ability to grow, work together, and hence wage war on neighboring groups and assimilate them into an empire. The larger the frontier, the higher the empire’s asabiya.
As an empire expands, (1) increased access to resources drives further growth; (2) internal conflict decreases asabiya among those who live far from the frontier; and (3) expanded size of the frontier decreases ability to wage war along all frontiers. When an empire’s asabiya decreases too much, it collapses.  Another group with more compelling asabiya eventually helps establish a new empire.

This model simulates a forest ecosystem affected by human logging. We explore different kind of approaches and their possible consequences for the ecosystem. Loggers can either be responsible or irresponsible, they will either take care to cut trees or not. In turn their actions will have consequences on the quality of the soil, the atmosphere as well as their profit made from logging. In this model we see that even careful management cannot prevent the degradation of the forest ecosystem.

Negotiation plays a fundamental role in shaping human societies, underpinning conflict resolution, institutional design, and economic coordination. This article introduces E³-MAN, a novel multi-agent model for negotiation that integrates individual utility maximization with fairness and institutional legitimacy. Unlike classical approaches grounded solely in game theory, our model incorporates Bayesian opponent modeling, transfer learning from past negotiation domains, and fallback institutional rules to resolve deadlocks. Agents interact in dynamic environments characterized by strategic heterogeneity and asymmetric information, negotiating over multidimensional issues under time constraints. Through extensive simulation experiments, we compare E³-MAN against the Nash bargaining solution and equal-split baselines using key performance metrics: utilitarian efficiency, Nash social welfare, Jain fairness index, Gini coefficient, and institutional compliance. Results show that E³-MAN achieves near-optimal efficiency while significantly improving distributive equity and agreement stability. A legal application simulating multilateral labor arbitration demonstrates that institutional default rules foster more balanced outcomes and increase negotiation success rates from 58% to 98%. By combining computational intelligence with normative constraints, this work contributes to the growing field of socially aware autonomous agents. It offers a virtual laboratory for exploring how simple institutional interventions can enhance justice, cooperation, and robustness in complex socio-legal systems.

Manipulate[
Module[{fDot, mDot, poly, roots, stableRoots, rStar, rIso,
endPointStar, endPointIso},(1. Define the System Dynamics)
fDot = phi1(f/m) - phi2(m/f);
mDot = mu1(f/m) - mu2(m/f);
(*2. Find the Equilibrium Ratio r=f/
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Dawkins’ Weasel is a NetLogo model that illustrates the principle of evolution by natural selection. It is inspired by a thought experiment presented by Richard Dawkins in his book The Blind Watchmaker (1996).

This agent-based model, developed for the study “Online Protest and Repression in Authoritarian Settings,” examines how online protest and repression evolve in authoritarian contexts and how these dynamics affect ordinary users’ attitudes and behavior on social media. The model integrates key theoretical and empirical insights into social media use and core political factors that shape digital contention in authoritarian settings. The following questions are addressed: (1) how online protest–repression dynamics unfold across different levels of authoritarianism and varying compositions of committed accounts, and (2) how ordinary users’ internal propensity to protest and their perceived probability of successful repression change during online protest-repression contestation. The model is evaluated against two empirically grounded macro patterns observed in the real world. The first is enduring protest: online protest becomes dominant as vocal protesters grow to outnumber vocal repressors, shrinking the pool of silent users and stabilizing a pro-protest majority. The second is suppressed protest: online dissent is contained as vocal repression and silence expand in response to protest, yielding a sustained majority of repressive and silent accounts. Together, these dynamics demonstrate how dissenting voices are empowered and suppressed online in authoritarian settings.

This study employs a hierarchical cross-departmental ABM to explore the question: How and to what extent are the land use policies enforced when assessed against the real-world land use pattern? Specifically, two sub-questions are of interest: How can real-world policy interactions be abstracted into the behavior across hierarchical governmental departments in the model? How can the level of enforcement for each land use policy be quantified under these interactions? We build three hierarchical agents—the central level, the local level that incorporates three departments, and the village collective level—with simplified but plausible processes of land use change, with levels of enforcement of different land use policies as key parameters. We calibrate the model using a genetic algorithm to determine those parameters and answer our research question. We further applied the model to simulate potential land use changes and investigate the implications of different policy options. The results are expected to provide insights into the intricate relationships shaping land use processes, contributing to evidence-based decision-making in urban planning and sustainable land use management.