Computational Model Library

Parallel trading systems

Marcin Czupryna | Published Fri Jun 26 18:01:25 2020

The model simulates agents behaviour in wine market parallel trading systems: auctions, OTC and Liv-ex. Models are written in JAVA and use MASON framework. To run a simulation download source files with additional src folder with sobol.csv file. In WineSimulation.java set RESULTS_FOLDER parameter. Uses following external libraries mason19..jar, opencsv.jar, commons-lang3-3.5.jar and commons-math3-3.6.1.jar.

Governing the commons

Marco Janssen | Published Tue Jan 14 17:12:29 2020

Model on the use of shared renewable resources including impact of imitation via success-bias and altruistic punishment.
The model is discussed in Introduction to Agent-Based Modeling by Marco Janssen. For more information see https://intro2abm.com/

I model a forest and a community of loggers. Agents follow different kinds of rules in order to log. I compare the impact of endogenous and of exogenous institutions on the state of the forest and on the profit of the users, representing different scenarios of participatory conservation projects.

A simple Multi-Agent System of the Tragedy Of the Commons (MASTOC-s)

Julia Schindler | Published Fri Jun 29 13:39:10 2012 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:19 2013

This is a simple model replicating Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons using reactive agents that have psychological behavioral and social preferences.

MASTOC - A Multi-Agent System of the Tragedy Of The Commons

Julia Schindler | Published Tue Nov 30 13:39:32 2010 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:40 2013

MASTOC is a replication of the Tragedy of the Commons by G. Hardin, programmed in NetLogo 4.0.4, based on behavioral game theory and Nash solution.

Peer reviewed Evolution of Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas

Marco Janssen Nathan Rollins | Published Fri Aug 20 18:41:16 2010 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013

This model can be used to explore under which conditions agents behave as observed in field experiments on irrigation games.

Token Foraging in a Commons Dilemma

Nicholas Radtke | Published Mon Aug 31 07:56:17 2009 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:51 2013

The model aims to mimic the observed behavior of participants in spatially explicit dynamic commons experiments.

CPNorm

Ruth Meyer | Published Sun Jun 4 14:19:17 2017 | Last modified Tue Jun 13 12:25:12 2017

CPNorm is a model of a community of harvesters using a common pool resource where adhering to the optimal extraction level has become a social norm. The model can be used to explore the robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons.

The Groundwater Commons Game

Juan Carlos Castilla-Rho Rodrigo Rojas | Published Thu May 11 13:04:53 2017 | Last modified Sat Sep 16 03:46:39 2017

The Groundwater Commons Game synthesises and extends existing work on human cooperation and collective action, to elucidate possible determinants and pathways to regulatory compliance in groundwater systems globally.

Irrigation game

Marco Janssen | Published Mon Jul 23 04:15:12 2012 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:37 2013

Irrigation game calibrated on experimental data

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