We develop an agent-based model (U-TRANS) to simulate the transition of an abstract city under an industrial revolution. By coupling the labour and housing markets, we propose a holistic framework that incorporates the key interacting factors and micro processes during the transition. Using U-TRANS, we look at five urban transition scenarios: collapse, weak recovery, transition, enhanced training and global recruit, and find the model is able to generate patterns observed in the real world. For example, We find that poor neighbourhoods benefit the most from growth in the new industry, whereas the rich neighbourhoods do better than the rest when the growth is slow or the situation deteriorates. We also find a (subtle) trade-off between growth and equality. The strategy to recruit a large number of skilled workers globally will lead to higher growth in GDP, population and human capital, but it will also entail higher inequality and market volatility, and potentially create a divide between the local and international workers. The holistic framework developed in this paper will help us better understand urban transition and detect early signals in the process. It can also be used as a test-bed for policy and growth strategies to help a city during a major economic and technological revolution.

The model aims to illustrate how Earned Value Management (EVM) provides an approach to measure a project’s performance by comparing its actual progress against the planned one, allowing it to evaluate trends to formulate forecasts. The instance performs a project execution and calculates the EVM performance indexes according to a Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB), which integrates the description of the work to do (scope), the deadlines for its execution (schedule), and the calculation of its costs and the resources required for its implementation (cost).

Specifically, we are addressing the following questions: How does the risk of execution delay or advance impact cost and schedule performance? How do the players’ number or individual work capacity impact cost and schedule estimations to finish? Regardless of why workers cause delays or produce overruns in their assignments, does EVM assess delivery performance and help make objective decisions?

To consider our model realistic enough for its purpose, we use the following patterns: The model addresses classic problems of Project Management (PM). It plays the typical task board where workers are assigned to complete a task backlog in project performance. Workers could delay or advance in the task execution, and we calculate the performance using the PMI-recommended Earned Value.

The tragedy of the commons in public resource governance is essentially the result of repeated interaction and adaptive learning among heterogeneous agents under dynamic resource constraints. Existing studies have generated rich insights into common-pool resource governance, institutional constraints, and cooperation, but they still rely mainly on theoretical deduction, static games, or econometric identification, making it difficult to jointly characterize resource dynamics, agent heterogeneity, behavioral learning, and policy scenarios. From the perspective of computational economics, this paper develops a multi-agent reinforcement learning simulation model for the governance of the tragedy of the commons. Specifically, the fish-pond resource system is formulated as a Markov decision process in discrete states, and adaptive decision-making under pure economic incentives, sustainability penalties, behavioral heterogeneity, and cooperation is characterized through the resource dynamics equation, harvesting equation, and differentiated reward functions. The model is further examined through sensitivity analysis, parameter calibration, and theoretical validation, and then used for policy simulation. The results show that pure economic incentives quickly induce resource collapse, sustainability penalties significantly reduce harvesting intensity and maintain a low but sustainable steady state, heterogeneous behavior parameters generate clear strategic divergence, and cooperation internalizes group harvesting constraints into individual payoffs and yields the strongest resource recovery and behavioral convergence.

We present a network agent-based model of ethnocentrism and intergroup cooperation in which agents from two groups (majority and minority) change their communality (feeling of group solidarity), cooperation strategy and social ties, depending on a barrier of “likeness” (affinity). Our purpose was to study the model’s capability for describing how the mechanisms of preexisting markers (or “tags”) that can work as cues for inducing in-group bias, imitation, and reaction to non-cooperating agents, lead to ethnocentrism or intergroup cooperation and influence the formation of the network of mixed ties between agents of different groups. We explored the model’s behavior via four experiments in which we studied the combined effects of “likeness,” relative size of the minority group, degree of connectivity of the social network, game difficulty (strength) and relative frequencies of strategy revision and structural adaptation. The parameters that have a stronger influence on the emerging dominant strategies and the formation of mixed ties in the social network are the group-tag barrier, the frequency with which agents react to adverse partners, and the game difficulty. The relative size of the minority group also plays a role in increasing the percentage of mixed ties in the social network. This is consistent with the intergroup ties being dependent on the “arena” of contact (with progressively stronger barriers from e.g. workmates to close relatives), and with measures that hinder intergroup contact also hindering mutual cooperation.

What is it?

This model demonstrates a very simple bidding market where buyers try to acquire a desired item at the best price in a competitive environment

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The model explores the impact of public disclosure on tax compliance among diverse agents, including individual taxpayers and a tax authority. It incorporates heterogeneous preferences and income endowments among taxpayers, captured through a utility function that considers psychic costs subtracted from expected pecuniary utility. These costs include moral, reciprocity, and stigma costs associated with norm violations, leading to variations in taxpayers’ risk attitudes and related parameters. The tax authority’s attributes, such as the frequency of random audits, penalty rate, and the choice between partial or full disclosure, remain fixed throughout the simulation. Income endowments and preference parameters are randomly assigned to taxpayers at the outset.

Taxpayers maximize their expected utility by reporting income, taking into account tax, penalty, and audit rates. They make annual decisions based on their own and their peers’ behaviors from the previous year. Taxpayers indirectly interact at the societal level through public disclosure conducted by the tax authority, exchanging tax information among peers. Each period in the simulation collects data on total reported income, average compliance rates per income group, distribution of compliance rates, counts of compliers, full evaders, partial evaders, and the numbers of taxpayers experiencing guilt and anger. The model evaluates whether public disclosure positively or negatively impacts compliance rates and quantifies this impact based on aggregated individual reporting behaviors.

Status-power dynamics on a playground, resulting in a status landscape with a gender status gap. Causal: individual (beauty, kindness, power), binary (rough-and-tumble; has-been-nice) or prior popularity (status). Cultural: acceptability of fighting.

This model looks at implications of author/referee interaction for quality and efficiency of peer review. It allows to investigate the importance of various reciprocity motives to ensure cooperation. Peer review is modelled as a process based on knowledge asymmetries and subject to evaluation bias. The model includes various simulation scenarios to test different interaction conditions and author and referee behaviour and various indexes that measure quality and efficiency of evaluation […]

The CHIME ABM explores information distribution networks and agents’ protective decision making in the context of hurricane landfall.

This model simulates different trade dynamics in shellmound (sambaqui) builder communities in coastal Southern Brazil. It features two simulation scenarios, one in which every site is the same and another one testing different rates of cooperation. The purpose of the model is to analyze the networks created by the trade dynamics and explore the different ways in which sambaqui communities were articulated in the past.

How it Works?
There are a few rules operating in this model. In either mode of simulation, each tick the agents will produce an amount of resources based on the suitability of the patches inside their occupation-radius, after that the procedures depend on the trade dynamic selected. For BRN? the agents will then repay their owed resources, update their reputation value and then trade again if they need to. For GRN? the agents will just trade with a connected agent if they need to. After that the agents will then consume a random amount of resources that they own and based on that they will grow (split) into a new site or be removed from the simulation. The simulation runs for 1000 ticks. Each patch correspond to a 300x300m square of land in the southern coast of Santa Catarina State in Brazil. Each agent represents a shellmound (sambaqui) builder community. The data for the world were made from a SRTM raster image (1 arc-second) in ArcMap. The sites can be exported into a shapefile (.shp) vector to display in ArcMap. It uses a UTM Sirgas 2000 22S projection system.