Organizations operate under conditions of imperfect performance in which human error is inevitable, yet errors are rarely examined as the triggers for the managerial interactions that shape organizational culture over time. The present research introduces an agent-based simulation of a work team completing a fixed sequence of tasks under varying degrees of managerial oversight and response policy. The model isolates the mechanical loss of throughput caused by errors from the psychological and cultural consequences of managerial reactions, which are categorized into ignoring, correcting or punishing. Furthermore, the model incorporates an autonomous self-notice mechanism, allowing workers to correct themselves in the absence of managerial intervention. By tracking the accumulation of worker resentment and the transient enhancements in learning, the simulation acts as a dynamic laboratory for observing delayed consequences, nonlinear tipping points and systemic organizational collapse. The results reveal a central paradox of organizational control. Highly monitored punitive environments generate high short-term throughput, yet they simultaneously accumulate interactional injustice and resentment that engineer a rapid cascading turnover and the highest probability of systemic collapse. Conversely, corrective policies combined with active monitoring achieve equivalent throughput while sustaining workforce viability. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis establishes that error accumulation is primarily determined by structural factors, namely agent-level mistake propensity and task difficulty, while resignation dynamics, resentment accumulation and collapse timing remain predominantly governed by managerial policy, a hierarchy independently corroborated by a surrogate model and shown to be stable across independent seeds and across stakeholder weighting scenarios. The study bridges the operational mechanics of task completion and the social dynamics of workplace mistreatment, illustrating how short-term punitive success often masks long-term structural fragility.

This is a NetLogo 7.0.1 agent-based model of interdependent team productivity under O-ring production logic. The model asks when collective problem-solving capacity (CPS) improves team output and when its effect is constrained by trust, burnout, specialization diversity, weak-link quality, and team-formation rules. Agents are heterogeneous in skill, CPS, trust, burnout, effort, learning rate, openness, specialization, adaptability, and aspiration. Each tick forms temporary teams, computes individual contribution quality, combines contributions through a geometric O-ring production function with an explicit weakest-link term, records output and success, and updates agents through feedback, learning, trust change, burnout, recovery, and turnover. The paper follows the ODD protocol, reports exact implementation equations, and analyzes six BehaviorSpace experiments with 50 stochastic repetitions per condition. Scenario results show that CPS is beneficial but not sufficient: productivity is highest when CPS is combined with trust, low burnout, effective coordination, and a reliable weakest-link floor. Diversity yields only modest gains at low CPS but larger gains when CPS is high. Formation-mode results are especially informative because mixed CPS-skill formation maximizes total output, whereas random formation has the highest binary success rate, showing that output magnitude and threshold success can diverge. The study contributes a transparent computational mechanism linking collective intelligence with O-ring production and identifies boundary conditions under which high-CPS teams can still be limited by weak links and interdependence.

STiMUS-HAI (Stigmergic–Mutualistic IMOI Model, Human-AI extension) is an agent-based model of teamwork in socio-technical systems where human and AI contributors collaborate through shared digital artefacts — wiki pages, code files, issue tickets, project cards, Scratch projects — represented as patches in a NetLogo world. It extends the human-only base model STiMUS v2.2, which established that two coordination mechanisms — stigmergy (indirect coordination through traces left in the environment) and mutualism (mutual benefit between contributors and the artefacts they tend) — can be decoupled: stigmergy decides where a contributor works, mutualism decides with what effort. STiMUS-HAI preserves this decoupling unchanged and adds two further theoretical questions: whether mixing AI agents into a human team distorts human coordination in ways that aggregate indicators hide, and whether AI’s cost to team outcomes depends on the type of work AI performs, not only on how much of it is present.

Two breeds of turtle — humans and ai-agents — follow identical target-selection, pheromone, and mutualism rules, so that any behavioural difference is attributable to team composition rather than a built-in advantage. The one designed asymmetry: AI agents never accumulate shared-mental-model and their motivation is fixed rather than adaptive. On top of this v3.0 baseline, v3.1 adds a task-type dimension to artefacts (“prediction” versus “judgment”, set via a judgment-share slider) that scales down AI edit-power specifically on judgment-requiring artefacts, and an ai-trust mechanic: humans build or lose trust in AI contributions based on the population-relative percentile rank of observed AI work quality (bottom-quartile work counts as an observed “error”), and that trust gates how much mutualistic benefit a human derives from continuing an AI’s work. Trust erodes quickly on a single error and recovers only after a streak of confirmed successes — an intentional asymmetry.

STiMUS (Stigmergic–Mutualistic IMOI Model) is an agent-based model of teamwork in socio-technical systems where contributors collaborate through shared digital artefacts — wiki pages, code files, issue tickets, project cards, Scratch projects — represented as patches in a NetLogo world. The model integrates two coordination mechanisms. Stigmergy is indirect coordination through traces left in a shared environment: each edit deposits a pheromone that diffuses to neighbouring patches and evaporates over time, so recent activity attracts further contributions. Mutualism is a reciprocal benefit loop in which valuable, well-maintained artefacts raise contributor motivation and shared understanding, while motivated contributors improve artefacts.

Contributors (turtles of the contributor breed) carry individual state: skill, motivation, shared-mental-model, specialty, benefit-gain, and an explicit-mode flag. At each tick every contributor selects a target artefact with an ant-colony-optimization-style rule weighing the artefact’s pheromone, incompleteness (1 - completeness), resource-value, and topic match between specialty and the artefact’s topic-tag; with probability p-explicit it instead takes the patch with the highest maintenance-need, modelling explicit task assignment. Each edit increases pheromone, quality, completeness and reuse-count, raises resource-value, lowers maintenance-need, and appends the editor to the artefact’s edit-authors list. When the previous last-editor-id differs from the current editor, the Edit Succession Ratio rises, the editor’s shared-mental-model grows, and a co-editing link is created — operationalising the idea that repeated cross-author succession on the same artefact builds shared understanding. Contributors’ motivation is updated from the benefit drawn from the visited artefact.

Each patch maintains a stigmergic layer (pheromone, quality, completeness, recentness, last-editor-id, edit-count, edit-authors) and a mutualistic layer (resource-value, reuse-count, maintenance-need, topic-tag), plus task flags (is-task?, task-complexity). Global monitors report the Edit Succession Ratio (ESR = cross-author-edits / total-edits, and an alternative esr-value = share of edited patches with more than one distinct author), mean-quality, mean-resource-value, a mutualism-index averaging contributor benefit and resource value, coediting-density (network density of the co-editing graph), active-pages-share, and task-completion-rate. The model logs every edit as a bipartite edge (tick, author_id, pageid, specialty, topic_tag, quality), exportable to CSV.

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An agent-based microsimulation of insecticide-treated net (ITN) distribution and adoption in Kenya (2003–2024), integrating the Theory of Planned Behaviour, Rogers diffusion, Weibull net decay, and a GPS-based two-layer social network. 8,561 household agents calibrated via Approximate Bayesian Computation to six DHS/MIS survey waves, achieving 2.42 pp mean absolute error on Kenya-level ownership. The analysis chain supports mechanism counterfactuals and policy experiments on equity outcomes of ITN distribution strategies.

This model is an agent-based simulation designed to explore how climate-induced environmental degradation can contribute to the emergence of social violence in coastal communities that depend heavily on ecosystem services for their livelihoods. The model represents a coupled social–ecological system in which environmental shocks—such as sea level rise and marine ecosystem decline—affect local economic conditions, food security, and community stability.

Agents in the model represent individuals whose livelihoods depend on coastal ecosystems. Environmental degradation reduces ecosystem productivity and increases economic hardship, which can lead to the formation of grievances among agents. The model incorporates behavioral thresholds that determine how individuals respond to hardship and perceived injustice. Under certain conditions—particularly when institutional capacity and law enforcement effectiveness are limited—these grievances may escalate into violent behavior.

The simulation allows users to explore how different climate scenarios, levels of ecosystem degradation, livelihood dependence, and institutional responses influence the probability of social instability and violence. By modeling the interactions between environmental stress, socio-economic vulnerability, and governance capacity, the model provides a computational framework for examining potential pathways linking climate change and conflict in coastal social–ecological systems.

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This model simulates a forest ecosystem affected by human logging. We explore different kind of approaches and their possible consequences for the ecosystem. Loggers can either be responsible or irresponsible, they will either take care to cut trees or not. In turn their actions will have consequences on the quality of the soil, the atmosphere as well as their profit made from logging. In this model we see that even careful management cannot prevent the degradation of the forest ecosystem.

HUMLAND Fire-in-the-Hole is a conceptual agent-based model (ABM) designed to explore the ecological and behavioral consequences of fire-driven hunting strategies employed by hunter-gatherers, specifically Neanderthals, during the Last Interglacial period around the Neumark-Nord (Germany) archaeological site.

This model builds on and specializes the HUMLAND 1.0.0 model (Nikulina et al. 2024), integrating anthropogenic fires, elephant group behavior, and landscape response to simulate interactions between humans, megafauna, and vegetation over time.

Negotiation plays a fundamental role in shaping human societies, underpinning conflict resolution, institutional design, and economic coordination. This article introduces E³-MAN, a novel multi-agent model for negotiation that integrates individual utility maximization with fairness and institutional legitimacy. Unlike classical approaches grounded solely in game theory, our model incorporates Bayesian opponent modeling, transfer learning from past negotiation domains, and fallback institutional rules to resolve deadlocks. Agents interact in dynamic environments characterized by strategic heterogeneity and asymmetric information, negotiating over multidimensional issues under time constraints. Through extensive simulation experiments, we compare E³-MAN against the Nash bargaining solution and equal-split baselines using key performance metrics: utilitarian efficiency, Nash social welfare, Jain fairness index, Gini coefficient, and institutional compliance. Results show that E³-MAN achieves near-optimal efficiency while significantly improving distributive equity and agreement stability. A legal application simulating multilateral labor arbitration demonstrates that institutional default rules foster more balanced outcomes and increase negotiation success rates from 58% to 98%. By combining computational intelligence with normative constraints, this work contributes to the growing field of socially aware autonomous agents. It offers a virtual laboratory for exploring how simple institutional interventions can enhance justice, cooperation, and robustness in complex socio-legal systems.

This agent-based model simulates the interactions between smallholder farming households, land-use dynamics, and ecosystem services in a rural landscape of Eastern Madagascar. It explores how alternative agricultural practices —shifting agriculture, rice cultivation, and agroforestry—combined with varying levels of forest protection, influence food production, food security, dietary diversity, and forest biodiversity over time. The landscape is represented as a grid of spatially explicit patches characterized by land use, ecological attributes, and regeneration dynamics. Agents make yearly decisions on land management based on demographic pressures, agricultural returns, and institutional constraints. Crop yields are affected by stochastic biotic and abiotic disruptions, modulated by local ecosystem regulation functions. The model additionally represents foraging as a secondary food source and pressure on biodiversity. The model supports the analysis of long-term trade-offs between agricultural productivity, human nutrition, and conservation under different policy and land-use scenarios.