Computational Model Library

Evolution of Conditional Cooperation

Marco Janssen Miles Manning Oyita Udiani | Published Thu Aug 1 04:03:07 2013 | Last modified Fri May 13 22:07:23 2022

Cultural group selection model used to evaluate the conditions for agents to evolve who have other-regarding preferences in making decisions in public good games.

This code is for an agent-based model of collective problem solving in which agents with different behavior strategies, explore the NK landscape while they communicate with their peers agents. This model is based on the famous work of Lazer, D., & Friedman, A. (2007), The network structure of exploration and exploitation.

The Archaeological Sampling Experimental Laboratory (tASEL)

Isaac Ullah | Published Fri Mar 11 21:14:43 2022 | Last modified Fri Apr 29 23:09:48 2022

The Archaeological Sampling Experimental Laboratory (tASEL) is an interactive tool for setting up and conducting experiments about sampling strategies for archaeological excavation, survey, and prospection.

This paper introduces an experimental and exploratory approach, combining game theory and Genetic Algorithms to create a model to simulate evolutionary economic learning. The objective of this paper is to document the implementation of a genetic algorithm as a simulator for economic learning, then analyze how strategic behavior affects the evolution towards optimal outcomes, departing from different starting points and potentially transforming conflict into harmonious scenarios. For this purpose, the introduced construct aimed at allowing for the evaluation of different strategy selection methods and game types. 144 unique 2x2 games, and three distinct strategy selection rules: Nash equilibrium, Hurwicz rule and a Random selection method were used in this study. The particularity of this paper is that rather than changing the strategies themselves or player-specific features, the introduced genetic algorithm changes the games based on the player payoffs. The outcome indicated optimal player scenarios for both The Nash equilibrium and Hurwicz rules strategies, the first being the best performing strategy. The random selection method fails to converge to optimal values in most of the populations, acting as a control feature and reinforcing that strategic behavior is necessary for the evolutionary learning process. We documented also two additional observations. First, the games are often transformed in such a way that agents can coordinate their strategies to achieve a stable optimal equilibrium. And second, we observed the mutation of the populations of games into sets of fewer (repeating) isomorphic games featuring strong characteristics of previous games.

Peer reviewed MOOvPOPsurveillance

Aniruddha Belsare Matthew Gompper Joshua J Millspaugh | Published Tue Apr 4 17:03:40 2017 | Last modified Tue May 12 16:37:24 2020

MOOvPOPsurveillance was developed as a tool for wildlife agencies to guide collection and analysis of disease surveillance data that relies on non-probabilistic methods like harvest-based sampling.

This model analyzes two investors forming their expectations with heterogeneous strategies in order to optimize their portfolios by means of a Sharpe ratio maximization. Traders are distinguished according to their methodology used in forecasting. Two acknowledged algorithms of technical analysis have been implemented to compare portfolios performances and assess profitability of each technique.

This model was created to investigate the potential impacts of large-scale recreational and transport-related physical activity promotion strategies on six United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) related outcomes—road traffic deaths (SDG 3), transportation mode share (SDG 9), convenient access to public transport, levels of fine particulate matter, and access to public open spaces (SDG 11), and levels of carbon dioxide emissions (SDG 13)—in three cities designed as abstract representations of common city types in high-, middle-, and low-income countries.

AMIRIS is the Agent-based Market model for the Investigation of Renewable and Integrated energy Systems.

It is an agent-based simulation of electricity markets and their actors.
AMIRIS enables researches to analyse and evaluate energy policy instruments and their impact on the actors involved in the simulation context.
Different prototypical agents on the electricity market interact with each other, each employing complex decision strategies.
AMIRIS allows to calculate the impact of policy instruments on economic performance of power plant operators and marketers.

This model is developed as a theoretical agent-based model to study the general phenomena of network-based targeting strategies on eco-innovation adoption and diffusion through inter-firm networks.

Prisoner's Tournament

Kristin Crouse | Published Wed Nov 6 05:39:54 2019 | Last modified Wed Dec 15 02:39:43 2021

This model replicates the Axelrod prisoner’s dilemma tournaments. The model takes as input a file of strategies and pits them against each other to see who achieves the best payoff in the end. Change the payoff structure to see how it changes the tournament outcome!

This website uses cookies and Google Analytics to help us track user engagement and improve our site. If you'd like to know more information about what data we collect and why, please see our data privacy policy. If you continue to use this site, you consent to our use of cookies.