HOSS(-5) is an exploratory agent-based prototype of a small artificial society, written in Python. Each agent is a “ph” (punto humano, “human point”) that is born, is educated, works, consumes and dies. Its yearly decisions depend on a psychological profile (archetype × character), its economic status and its intentionality. Agents interact indirectly through families, firms in 10 sectors, a labour market with about 200 job categories, and a State that provides public services, employment and a Universal Basic Income, adjusting taxes and UBI each year to seek fiscal balance.

The model simulates a few thousand agents over decades of virtual time and records yearly aggregates (population, GDP, income, Gini index, HDI). A separate analysis script explores the results and fits Gamma distributions to individual incomes, comparing the shape parameter with Gini and HDI.

HOSS does not aim to predict real societies or claim empirical validation. It is a sandbox for comparing scenarios and thinking about the organizational design of society from an engineering perspective. Known limitations: no direct social relations between agents, prices and production follow simple rules rather than supply-demand dynamics, and organizations are black boxes.

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Viking Sailing is a spatially explicit agent-based simulation for conditional exploration of how rasterized coastlines, wind, and
surface-current conditions interact with simplified ship movement, sailing, rowing, navigation, and land-avoidance rules. The
model compares simulated route trajectories and terminal outcomes for hypothetical Viking-era small-ship voyages. It includes an example dataset representing sea surface winds and currents from June 1000 CE. Additional data can are downloaded from Zenodo: https://zenodo.org/records/23213147.

Artificial Anasazi is an agent-based model of farming households in the Long House Valley, Arizona, from 800 to 1350 CE. Each household chooses where to farm and settle based on expected harvest, water sources and stored maize, and simulated household counts are compared with the archaeological record.

This release adapts the NetLogo Models Library version (Stonedahl & Wilensky 2010) of Janssen’s (2009) NetLogo replication of the original Ascape model (Dean et al. 2000; Axtell et al. 2002). It contains four configurations in one NetLogo 7.0.4 file, selected with two switches:

• Both switches off: the baseline, which is the Models Library model with small fixes that make it work as intended (the arable-uplands zone name, the setup base yield, the initial household count, one-tick-lag capacity reporting, and seed control with observation-only instruments).
• soil-on?: dynamic soil quality that depletes under cultivation and regrows, following Janssen (2010, eq. 4).
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An agent-based model to explore human–wild boar interactions in urban and suburban landscapes at the interface with agricultural land and natural habitats, by simulating wild boar population growth, mortality, and movements across the landscape

patch_choice_enhanced.nlogox is an agent-based model (ABM) implementing the patch choice model from optimal foraging theory (OFT) in a multi-agent simulation environment. It extends the classical single-forager, equation-based Marginal Value Theorem (MVT) formulation to support multiple competing foragers, demographic processes, bounded memory, and stochastic resource dynamics on a spatially heterogeneous landscape.

Organizations operate under conditions of imperfect performance in which human error is inevitable, yet errors are rarely examined as the triggers for the managerial interactions that shape organizational culture over time. The present research introduces an agent-based simulation of a work team completing a fixed sequence of tasks under varying degrees of managerial oversight and response policy. The model isolates the mechanical loss of throughput caused by errors from the psychological and cultural consequences of managerial reactions, which are categorized into ignoring, correcting or punishing. Furthermore, the model incorporates an autonomous self-notice mechanism, allowing workers to correct themselves in the absence of managerial intervention. By tracking the accumulation of worker resentment and the transient enhancements in learning, the simulation acts as a dynamic laboratory for observing delayed consequences, nonlinear tipping points and systemic organizational collapse. The results reveal a central paradox of organizational control. Highly monitored punitive environments generate high short-term throughput, yet they simultaneously accumulate interactional injustice and resentment that engineer a rapid cascading turnover and the highest probability of systemic collapse. Conversely, corrective policies combined with active monitoring achieve equivalent throughput while sustaining workforce viability. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis establishes that error accumulation is primarily determined by structural factors, namely agent-level mistake propensity and task difficulty, while resignation dynamics, resentment accumulation and collapse timing remain predominantly governed by managerial policy, a hierarchy independently corroborated by a surrogate model and shown to be stable across independent seeds and across stakeholder weighting scenarios. The study bridges the operational mechanics of task completion and the social dynamics of workplace mistreatment, illustrating how short-term punitive success often masks long-term structural fragility.

This is a NetLogo 7.0.1 agent-based model of interdependent team productivity under O-ring production logic. The model asks when collective problem-solving capacity (CPS) improves team output and when its effect is constrained by trust, burnout, specialization diversity, weak-link quality, and team-formation rules. Agents are heterogeneous in skill, CPS, trust, burnout, effort, learning rate, openness, specialization, adaptability, and aspiration. Each tick forms temporary teams, computes individual contribution quality, combines contributions through a geometric O-ring production function with an explicit weakest-link term, records output and success, and updates agents through feedback, learning, trust change, burnout, recovery, and turnover. The paper follows the ODD protocol, reports exact implementation equations, and analyzes six BehaviorSpace experiments with 50 stochastic repetitions per condition. Scenario results show that CPS is beneficial but not sufficient: productivity is highest when CPS is combined with trust, low burnout, effective coordination, and a reliable weakest-link floor. Diversity yields only modest gains at low CPS but larger gains when CPS is high. Formation-mode results are especially informative because mixed CPS-skill formation maximizes total output, whereas random formation has the highest binary success rate, showing that output magnitude and threshold success can diverge. The study contributes a transparent computational mechanism linking collective intelligence with O-ring production and identifies boundary conditions under which high-CPS teams can still be limited by weak links and interdependence.

STiMUS-HAI (Stigmergic–Mutualistic IMOI Model, Human-AI extension) is an agent-based model of teamwork in socio-technical systems where human and AI contributors collaborate through shared digital artefacts — wiki pages, code files, issue tickets, project cards, Scratch projects — represented as patches in a NetLogo world. It extends the human-only base model STiMUS v2.2, which established that two coordination mechanisms — stigmergy (indirect coordination through traces left in the environment) and mutualism (mutual benefit between contributors and the artefacts they tend) — can be decoupled: stigmergy decides where a contributor works, mutualism decides with what effort. STiMUS-HAI preserves this decoupling unchanged and adds two further theoretical questions: whether mixing AI agents into a human team distorts human coordination in ways that aggregate indicators hide, and whether AI’s cost to team outcomes depends on the type of work AI performs, not only on how much of it is present.

Two breeds of turtle — humans and ai-agents — follow identical target-selection, pheromone, and mutualism rules, so that any behavioural difference is attributable to team composition rather than a built-in advantage. The one designed asymmetry: AI agents never accumulate shared-mental-model and their motivation is fixed rather than adaptive. On top of this v3.0 baseline, v3.1 adds a task-type dimension to artefacts (“prediction” versus “judgment”, set via a judgment-share slider) that scales down AI edit-power specifically on judgment-requiring artefacts, and an ai-trust mechanic: humans build or lose trust in AI contributions based on the population-relative percentile rank of observed AI work quality (bottom-quartile work counts as an observed “error”), and that trust gates how much mutualistic benefit a human derives from continuing an AI’s work. Trust erodes quickly on a single error and recovers only after a streak of confirmed successes — an intentional asymmetry.

STiMUS (Stigmergic–Mutualistic IMOI Model) is an agent-based model of teamwork in socio-technical systems where contributors collaborate through shared digital artefacts — wiki pages, code files, issue tickets, project cards, Scratch projects — represented as patches in a NetLogo world. The model integrates two coordination mechanisms. Stigmergy is indirect coordination through traces left in a shared environment: each edit deposits a pheromone that diffuses to neighbouring patches and evaporates over time, so recent activity attracts further contributions. Mutualism is a reciprocal benefit loop in which valuable, well-maintained artefacts raise contributor motivation and shared understanding, while motivated contributors improve artefacts.

Contributors (turtles of the contributor breed) carry individual state: skill, motivation, shared-mental-model, specialty, benefit-gain, and an explicit-mode flag. At each tick every contributor selects a target artefact with an ant-colony-optimization-style rule weighing the artefact’s pheromone, incompleteness (1 - completeness), resource-value, and topic match between specialty and the artefact’s topic-tag; with probability p-explicit it instead takes the patch with the highest maintenance-need, modelling explicit task assignment. Each edit increases pheromone, quality, completeness and reuse-count, raises resource-value, lowers maintenance-need, and appends the editor to the artefact’s edit-authors list. When the previous last-editor-id differs from the current editor, the Edit Succession Ratio rises, the editor’s shared-mental-model grows, and a co-editing link is created — operationalising the idea that repeated cross-author succession on the same artefact builds shared understanding. Contributors’ motivation is updated from the benefit drawn from the visited artefact.

Each patch maintains a stigmergic layer (pheromone, quality, completeness, recentness, last-editor-id, edit-count, edit-authors) and a mutualistic layer (resource-value, reuse-count, maintenance-need, topic-tag), plus task flags (is-task?, task-complexity). Global monitors report the Edit Succession Ratio (ESR = cross-author-edits / total-edits, and an alternative esr-value = share of edited patches with more than one distinct author), mean-quality, mean-resource-value, a mutualism-index averaging contributor benefit and resource value, coediting-density (network density of the co-editing graph), active-pages-share, and task-completion-rate. The model logs every edit as a bipartite edge (tick, author_id, pageid, specialty, topic_tag, quality), exportable to CSV.

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An agent-based microsimulation of insecticide-treated net (ITN) distribution and adoption in Kenya (2003–2024), integrating the Theory of Planned Behaviour, Rogers diffusion, Weibull net decay, and a GPS-based two-layer social network. 8,561 household agents calibrated via Approximate Bayesian Computation to six DHS/MIS survey waves, achieving 2.42 pp mean absolute error on Kenya-level ownership. The analysis chain supports mechanism counterfactuals and policy experiments on equity outcomes of ITN distribution strategies.