This model simulates different trade dynamics in shellmound (sambaqui) builder communities in coastal Southern Brazil. It features two simulation scenarios, one in which every site is the same and another one testing different rates of cooperation. The purpose of the model is to analyze the networks created by the trade dynamics and explore the different ways in which sambaqui communities were articulated in the past.

How it Works?
There are a few rules operating in this model. In either mode of simulation, each tick the agents will produce an amount of resources based on the suitability of the patches inside their occupation-radius, after that the procedures depend on the trade dynamic selected. For BRN? the agents will then repay their owed resources, update their reputation value and then trade again if they need to. For GRN? the agents will just trade with a connected agent if they need to. After that the agents will then consume a random amount of resources that they own and based on that they will grow (split) into a new site or be removed from the simulation. The simulation runs for 1000 ticks. Each patch correspond to a 300x300m square of land in the southern coast of Santa Catarina State in Brazil. Each agent represents a shellmound (sambaqui) builder community. The data for the world were made from a SRTM raster image (1 arc-second) in ArcMap. The sites can be exported into a shapefile (.shp) vector to display in ArcMap. It uses a UTM Sirgas 2000 22S projection system.

The model explores how two types of information - social (in the form of pheromone trails) and private (in the form of route memories) affect ant colony level foraging in a variable enviroment.

The model studies the dynamics of risk-sharing cooperatives among heterogeneous farmers. Based on their knowledge on their risk exposure and the performance of the cooperative farmers choose whether or not to remain in the risk-sharing agreement.

This model computes the guaranteed viability kernel of a model describing the evolution of a population submitted to successive floods.
The population is described by its wealth and its adaptation rate to floods, the control are information campaigns that have a cost but increase the adaptation rate and the expected successive floods belong to given set defined by the maximal high and the minimal time between two floods.

This is a conceptual model of underlying forces creating industrial clusters. There are two contradictory forces - attraction and repulsion. Firms within the same Industry are attracted to each other and on the other hand, firms with the same Activity are repulsed from each other. In each round firm with the lowest fitness is selected to change its profile of Industries and Activities. Based on these simple rules interesting patterns emerge.

This is a set of threshold public goods games models. Set consists of baseline model, endogenous shared punishment model, endogenous shared punishment model with activists and cooperation model. In each round, all agents are granted a budget of size set in GUI. Then they decide on how much they contribute to public goods and how much they keep. Public goods are provided only if the sum of contributions meets or exceeds the threshold defined in the GUI. After each round agents evaluate their strategy and payoff from this strategy.

The core algorithm is an agent-based model, which simulates travel patterns on a network based on microscopic decision-making by each traveler.

This spatially explicit agent-based model addresses how effective foraging radius (r_e) affects the effective size–and thus the equilibrium cultural diversity–of a structured population composed of central-place foraging groups.

The model reproduces the spread of environmental awareness among agents and the impact of awareness level of the agents on the consumption of a resource, like energy. An agent is a household with a set of available advanced smart metering functions.

Both models simulate n-person prisoner dilemma in groups (left figure) where agents decide to C/D – using a stochastic threshold algorithm with reinforcement learning components. We model fixed (single group ABM) and dynamic groups (bad-barrels ABM). The purpose of the bad-barrels model is to assess the impact of information during meritocratic matching. In the bad-barrels model, we incorporated a multidimensional structure in which agents are also embedded in a social network (2-person PD). We modeled a random and homophilous network via a random spatial graph algorithm (right figure).