This is the Toy Trader but with two additional goods being traded.

We compare the effect of four activation regimes by measuring the appropriate opinion clustering statistics and also the number of emergent extremists.

The model represents a set of social actors engaged into a collegiate (composed of representants of civil society and public sector) to manage the Southern Rural Territory of Sergipe (SRTS), created by two territorial public policies, the National Program for the Sustainable Development of Rural Territories (PRONAT) and the Program Territories of Citizenship (PTC) which aim at balancing power relations between social actors of Rural Territories. The main gola of these public policies is to empower the civil society engaged in the territory to enable them to negotiate with the traditional power (mainly majors). It was designed two models of the SRTS, one that represents the situation in 2012, and other that represents the social interdependencies in 2017. For each period it is possible to measure the capability and power of each modeled social actor and see whether it is observed the empowerment of the civil society or not.

This version of the accumulated copying error (ACE) model is designed to address the following research question: how does finite population size (N) affect the coefficient of variation (CV) of a continuous cultural trait under the assumptions that the only source of copying error is visual perception error and that the continuous trait can take any positive value (i.e., it has no upper bound)? The model allows one to address this question while assuming the continuous trait is transmitted via vertical transmission, unbiased transmission, prestige biased transmission, mean conformist transmission, or median conformist transmission. By varying the parameter, p, one can also investigate the effect of population size under a mix of vertical and non-vertical transmission, whereby on average (1-p)N individuals learn via vertical transmission and pN individuals learn via either unbiased transmission, prestige biased transmission, mean conformist transmission, or median conformist transmission.

ICARUS is a multi-agent compliance inspection model (ICARUS - Inspecting Compliance to mAny RUleS). The model is applicable to environments where an inspection agency, via centrally coordinated inspections, examines compliance in organizations which must comply with multiple provisions (rules). The model (ICARUS) contains 3 types of agents: entities, inspection agency and inspectors / inspections. ICARUS describes a repeated, simultaneous, non-cooperative game of pure competition. Agents have imperfect, incomplete, asymmetric information. Entities in each move (tick) choose a pure strategy (comply/violate) for each rule, depending on their own subjective assessment of the probability of the inspection. The Inspection Agency carries out the given inspection strategy.

A more detailed description of the model is available in the .nlogo file.
Full description of the model (in line with the ODD+D protocol) and the analysis of the model (including verification, validation and sensitivity analysis) can be found in the attached documentation.

This is the model for a paper that is based on a simulation model, programmed in Netlogo, that demonstrates changes in market structure that occur as marginal costs, demand, and barriers to entry change. Students predict and observe market structure changes in terms of number of firms, market concentration, market price and quantity, and average marginal costs, profits, and markups across the market as firms innovate. By adjusting the demand growth and barriers to entry, students can […]

This is version 1 of the Parental Investment Model by Aktipis & Fernandez-Duque.

Irrigation game calibrated on experimental data

In the context switching model, a society of agents embedded in multiple social relations, engages in a simple abstract game: the consensus game. Each agent has to choose towards one of two possible choices which are basically arbitrary. The objective of the game is to reach a global consensus, but the particular choice that gets collectively selected is irrelevant.

This is a replication of the Pumpa model that simulates the Pumpa Irrigation System in Nepal (Cifdaloz et al., 2010).