Computational Model Library

Displaying 10 of 369 results for "Jonathan Marino" clear search

Adoption as a social marker

Paul Smaldino | Published Monday, October 17, 2016

A model of innovation diffusion in a structured population with two groups who are averse to adopting a produce popular with the outgroup.

Peer reviewed NetLogo model of USA mass shootings

Smarzhevskiy Ivan | Published Tuesday, September 24, 2019 | Last modified Tuesday, April 14, 2020

Is the mass shooter a maniac or a relatively normal person in a state of great stress? According to the FBI report (Silver, J., Simons, A., & Craun, S. (2018). A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the United States Between 2000 – 2013. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice,Washington, D.C. 20535.), only 25% of the active shooters were known to have been diagnosed by a mental health professional with a mental illness of any kind prior to the offense.
The main objects of the model are the humans and the guns. The main factors influencing behavior are the population size, the number of people with mental disabilities (“psycho” in the model terminology) per 100,000 population, the total number of weapons (“guns”) in the population, the availability of guns for humans, the intensity of stressors affecting humans and the threshold level of stress, upon reaching which a person commits an act of mass shooting.
The key difference (in the model) between a normal person and a psycho is that a psycho accumulates stressors and, upon reaching a threshold level, commits an act of mass shooting. A normal person is exposed to stressors, but reaching the threshold level for killing occurs only when the simultaneous effect of stressors on him exceeds this level.
The population dynamics are determined by the following factors: average (normally distributed) life expectancy (“life_span” attribute of humans) and population growth with the percentage of newborns set by the value of the TickReprRatio% slider of the current population volume from 16 to 45 years old.Thus, one step of model time corresponds to a year.

Evolution of cooperative strategies from first principles

Marco Janssen | Published Monday, January 04, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

The purpose of this model is to study the evolution of cooperation when agents are endowed with a limited set of receptors, a set of elementary actions and a neural network agents use to make decision

Evolution of cooperation with strangers

Marco Janssen | Published Friday, October 15, 2010 | Last modified Wednesday, November 13, 2013

The model is used to study the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recogniz

Lansing-Kremer model of the Balinese irrigation system

Marco Janssen | Published Monday, June 16, 2008 | Last modified Tuesday, December 16, 2014

This is a NetLogo replication of the hill-climbing version of the Lansing-Kremer model of Balinese irrigation.

Evolution of altruistic punishment

Marco Janssen | Published Wednesday, September 03, 2008 | Last modified Saturday, March 09, 2019

In the model agents make decisions to contribute of not to the public good of a group, and cooperators may punish, at a cost, defectors. The model is based on group selection, and is used to understan

Population aggregation in ancient arid environments

Marco Janssen | Published Tuesday, May 04, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

The purpose of this model is to help understand how prehistoric societies adapted to the prehistoric American southwest landscape. In the American southwest there is a high degree of environmental var

Model to simulation the landscape of possible shedding games

Marco Janssen | Published Sunday, May 16, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This model simulates 2048 versions of shedding games and evaluates the consequences on the average length and the difficulty of the game agents experience. The purpose of the model is to understand th

Evolution of shedding games

Marco Janssen | Published Sunday, May 16, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This simulates the evolution of rules of shedding games based on cultural group selection. A number of groups play shedding games and evaluate the consequences on the average length and the difficulty

Evolution of cooperation via indirect reciprocity by image scoring

Marco Janssen | Published Friday, October 22, 2010 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

The model explores the possibility of the evolution of cooperation due to indirect reciprocity when agents derive information about the past behavior of the opponent in one-shot dilemma games.

Displaying 10 of 369 results for "Jonathan Marino" clear search

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