Computational Model Library

An Agent-Based Simulation of Continuous-Time Public Goods Games

Tuong Vu | Published Thu May 17 10:39:29 2018 | Last modified Tue Apr 2 09:28:13 2019

To our knowledge, this is the first agent-based simulation of continuous-time PGGs (where participants can change contributions at any time) which are much harder to realise within both laboratory and simulation environments.

Work related to this simulation has been published in the following journal article:
Vu, Tuong Manh, Wagner, Christian and Siebers, Peer-Olaf (2019) ‘ABOOMS: Overcoming the Hurdles of Continuous-Time Public Goods Games with a Simulation-Based Approach’ Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 22 (2) 7 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/22/2/7.html. doi: 10.18564/jasss.3995

Abstract:

Evolution of cooperation with strangers

Marco Janssen | Published Fri Oct 15 20:05:27 2010 | Last modified Wed Nov 13 23:46:20 2013

The model is used to study the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recogniz

Agent-Based Model for the Evolution of Ethnocentrism

Max Hartshorn | Published Sat Mar 24 21:34:18 2012 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:21 2013

This is an implementation of an agent based model for the evolution of ethnocentrism. While based off a model published by Hammond and Axelrod (2006), the code has been modified to allow for a more fine-grained analysis of evolutionary dynamics.

cultural group and persistent parochialism

Jae-Woo Kim | Published Mon Nov 8 06:23:12 2010 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:28 2013

Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in

Evolution of cooperation via indirect reciprocity by image scoring

Marco Janssen | Published Fri Oct 22 19:35:45 2010 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013

The model explores the possibility of the evolution of cooperation due to indirect reciprocity when agents derive information about the past behavior of the opponent in one-shot dilemma games.

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