Country-by-Country Reporting and Automatic Exchange of Information have recently been implemented in European Union (EU) countries. These international tax reforms increase tax compliance in the short term. In the long run, however, taxpayers will continue looking abroad to avoid taxation and, countries, looking for additional revenues, will provide opportunities. As a result, tax competition intensifies and the initial increase in compliance could reverse. To avoid international tax reforms being counteracted by tax competition, this paper suggests bilateral responsive regulation to maximize compliance. This implies that countries would use different tax policy instruments toward other countries, including tax and secrecy havens.

To assess the effectiveness of fully or partially enforce tax policies, this agent based model has been ran many times under different enforcement rules, which influence the perceived enforced- and voluntary compliance, as the slippery-slope model prescribes. Based on the dynamics of this perception and the extent to which agents influence each other, the annual amounts of tax evasion, tax avoidance and taxes paid are calculated over longer periods of time.

The agent-based simulation finds that a differentiated policy response could increase tax compliance by 6.54 percent, which translates into an annual increase of €105 billion in EU tax revenues on income, profits, and capital gains. Corporate income tax revenues in France, Spain, and the UK alone would already account for €35 billion.

ICARUS is a multi-agent compliance inspection model (ICARUS - Inspecting Compliance to mAny RUleS). The model is applicable to environments where an inspection agency, via centrally coordinated inspections, examines compliance in organizations which must comply with multiple provisions (rules). The model (ICARUS) contains 3 types of agents: entities, inspection agency and inspectors / inspections. ICARUS describes a repeated, simultaneous, non-cooperative game of pure competition. Agents have imperfect, incomplete, asymmetric information. Entities in each move (tick) choose a pure strategy (comply/violate) for each rule, depending on their own subjective assessment of the probability of the inspection. The Inspection Agency carries out the given inspection strategy.

A more detailed description of the model is available in the .nlogo file.
Full description of the model (in line with the ODD+D protocol) and the analysis of the model (including verification, validation and sensitivity analysis) can be found in the attached documentation.

The purpose of the model is to explore how processes associated with compliance across different fishery actors’ social groups interplay with their acceptance of a fishery intervention, herein periodic closures of a small-scale octopus fishery. The model agents, entities and processes are designed based on stylized facts from literature and expert workshops on periodic closures in the Western Indian Ocean region, as well as fieldwork from Zanzibari villages that have implemented periodic octopus closures. The model is designed for scientists and decision-makers that are interested in understanding the complex interplay between fishers from different social groups, herein foot fisher men, foot fisher women and male skin divers or free divers within the periodic closure of an octopus species. Including various actions resulting from the restrictions, that is - opportunities that may be presented from restricting fishing in certain areas and during certain times. We are soon publishing an updated model with individual octopuses and their movement behaviors.

Pandemic (pip install pandemic)

An agent model in which commuting, compliance, testing and contagion parameters drive infection in a population of thousands of millions. Agents follow Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes in the plane and collisions drive transmission. Results are stored at SwarmPrediction.com for further analysis, and can be retrieved by anyone.

This is a very simple simulation that in a special case can be shown to be approximated by a compartmental model with time varying infection rate.

This model can be used to optimize intervention strategies for inspection services.

The Groundwater Commons Game synthesises and extends existing work on human cooperation and collective action, to elucidate possible determinants and pathways to regulatory compliance in groundwater systems globally.

We built a model using R,polr package, to assess 55 published case studies from developing countries to determine what factors influence the level of compliance of local communities with protected area regulations.