This model is used to simulate the influence of spatially and temporally variable sedimentary processes on the distribution of dated archaeological features in a surface context.

This model reimplement Weiner et al. 2001 Zone Of Influence model to simulate plant growth under competition. The reimplementation in Netlogo and the ODD description in the “info” tab try to be as consistent as possible with the original paper.

This model compares rules for allocating a fixed budget of opportunity (places, training, funding) among people who differ in potential and will. Each agent’s effective potential, its denatotita, is potential multiplied by will. Realisation is denatotita multiplied by the opportunity received, and an agent succeeds when realisation reaches a threshold. Nine allocation regimes are compared: equal shares; shares proportional to denatotita; three threshold rules that reclaim and redistribute the allocations of those who would fail; an efficient benchmark that maximises successes; and three forward-looking rules (foresight, will-aware foresight and hindsight). A mixed regime blends targeting with equal shares. Over time, opportunity develops potential through a skill-formation technology, and will rises with success and falls when an agent is passed over. The model reproduces the article’s results: a closed-form crossover between equal and proportional allocation; a reversal in favour of broad allocation when development is productive; a hollowing-out of potential under success-maximising allocation; and the failure of mixtures of targeting and equal shares. Written in Python (NumPy, pandas, Matplotlib), with fixed random seeds so results are exactly reproducible.

We used our model to test how different combinations of dominance interactions present in H. saltator could result in linear, despotic, or shared hierarchies.

This is a simulation model to explore possible outcomes of the Port of Mars cardgame. Port of Mars is a resource allocation game examining how people navigate conflicts between individual goals and common interests relative to shared resources. The game involves five players, each of whom must decide how much of their time and effort to invest in maintaining public infrastructure and renewing shared resources and how much to expend in pursuit of their individual goals. In the game, “Upkeep” is a number that represents the physical health of the community. This number begins at 100 and goes down by twenty-five points each round, representing resource consumption and wear and tear on infrastructure. If that number reaches zero, the community collapses and everyone dies.

Contains python3 code to replicate the opinion dynamics model from our (so far unpublished) JASSS sumbission “A Balance Model of Opinion Hyperpolarization”. The main function is run_model(), which returns a dictionary object containing various outcome metrics.

This Netlogo replication of Kollman, K., J.H. Miller and S.E. Page (1997) Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model, American Economic Review 87(5): 977-992. The model consists of of citizens who can vote for partie and move to other jurisdictions if they expect their preferences are better served. Parties adjust their positions to increase their share in the elections.

This model is a spatial evolutionary game theory model in which animals with inherited red or blue phenotypes move, interact locally, gain or lose energy based on payoff structure, and reproduce across generations. Plants provide a stationary green component of the environment. The model can be used to examine how game payoffs, inheritance, and survival shape population and evolutionary dynamics over time.

This is a set of threshold public goods games models. Set consists of baseline model, endogenous shared punishment model, endogenous shared punishment model with activists and cooperation model. In each round, all agents are granted a budget of size set in GUI. Then they decide on how much they contribute to public goods and how much they keep. Public goods are provided only if the sum of contributions meets or exceeds the threshold defined in the GUI. After each round agents evaluate their strategy and payoff from this strategy.

This model can be used to explore under which conditions agents behave as observed in field experiments on irrigation games.