Computational Model Library

ICARUS is a multi-agent compliance inspection model (ICARUS - Inspecting Compliance to mAny RUleS). The model is applicable to environments where an inspection agency, via centrally coordinated inspections, examines compliance in organizations which must comply with multiple provisions (rules). The model (ICARUS) contains 3 types of agents: entities, inspection agency and inspectors / inspections. ICARUS describes a repeated, simultaneous, non-cooperative game of pure competition. Agents have imperfect, incomplete, asymmetric information. Entities in each move (tick) choose a pure strategy (comply/violate) for each rule, depending on their own subjective assessment of the probability of the inspection. The Inspection Agency carries out the given inspection strategy.

A more detailed description of the model is available in the .nlogo file.
Full description of the model (in line with the ODD+D protocol) and the analysis of the model (including verification, validation and sensitivity analysis) can be found in the attached documentation.

Food supply chain innovations under public pressure

Tim Verwaart Wil Hennen Jan Buurma | Published Fri Apr 15 20:30:05 2016 | Last modified Tue Nov 27 20:11:41 2018

Aroused public opinion has led to public debates on social responsibility issues in food supply chains. This model based op opinion dynamics and the linkages between involved actors simulates the public debate leading to the transitions.

Takács, K. and Squazzoni, F. 2015. High Standards Enhance Inequality in Idealized Labor Markets. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 18(4), 2,
We built a simple model of an idealized labor market, in which there is no objective difference in average quality between groups and hiring decisions are not biased in favor of any particular group. Our results show that inequality in employment emerges necessarily also in such idealized situations due to the limited supply of high quality individuals and asymmetric information. Inequalities are exacerbated when employers have high standards and keep only the best workers in house. We found that ambitious workers get higher quality jobs even if ambition does not correlate or even negatively correlates with internal quality. Our findings help to corroborate empirical findings on higher employment discrepancies in high rather than low status jobs.

Peer reviewed Evolution of Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas

Marco Janssen Nathan Rollins | Published Fri Aug 20 18:41:16 2010 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013

This model can be used to explore under which conditions agents behave as observed in field experiments on irrigation games.

Irrigation game

Marco Janssen | Published Mon Jul 23 04:15:12 2012 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:37 2013

Irrigation game calibrated on experimental data

Peer reviewed AZOI: Another Zone Of Influence model

Cyril Piou | Published Wed Jul 23 09:54:52 2014 | Last modified Thu Dec 11 21:26:34 2014

This model reimplement Weiner et al. 2001 Zone Of Influence model to simulate plant growth under competition. The reimplementation in Netlogo and the ODD description in the “info” tab try to be as consistent as possible with the original paper.

Asymmetric two-sided matching

Naoki Shiba | Published Wed Jan 9 09:45:46 2013 | Last modified Tue May 28 08:44:50 2013

This model is an extended version of the matching problem including the mate search problem, which is the generalization of a traditional optimization problem. The matching problem is extended to a form of asymmetric two-sided matching problem.

Modeling information Asymmetries in Tourism

Rodolfo Baggio Jacopo Baggio | Published Mon Jan 9 20:43:10 2012 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:40 2013

A very simple model elaborated to explore what may happens when buyers (travelers) have more information than sellers (tourist destinations)

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