Computational Model Library

Displaying 10 of 12 results prisoner's dilemma clear filters

DINO model - Dynamics of Internalization and Dissemination of Norms

Marlene Batzke | Published Wednesday, January 11, 2023 | Last modified Saturday, August 19, 2023

The DINO model (Dynamics of Internalization and Dissemimnation of Norms) simulates a conceptual model on the dynamics of norm internalization in the decision-making framework of a 3-person prisoner’s dilemma game.

Prisoner's Tournament

Kristin Crouse | Published Wednesday, November 06, 2019 | Last modified Wednesday, December 15, 2021

This model replicates the Axelrod prisoner’s dilemma tournaments. The model takes as input a file of strategies and pits them against each other to see who achieves the best payoff in the end. Change the payoff structure to see how it changes the tournament outcome!

Modeling Prejudice And Its Effect On Societal Prosperity

no contributors listed | Published Sunday, June 27, 2021

Existing studies on prejudice, which is important in multi-group dynamics in societies, focus on the social-psychological knowledge behind the processes involving prejudice and its propagation. We instead create a multi-agent framework that simulates the propagation of prejudice and measures its tangible impact on the prosperity of individuals as well as of larger social structures, including groups and factions within. Groups in society help us define prejudice, and factions represent smaller tight-knit circles of individuals with similar opinions. We model social interactions using the Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma (CPD) and a type of agent called a prejudiced agent, whose cooperation is affected by a prejudice attribute, updated over time based both on the agent’s own experiences and those of others in its faction. This model generates various results that both provide new insights into intergroup prejudice and its effects, as well as highlight and reinforce certain existing notions of prejudice.

Stochastic vs. Deterministic Spatial PD

Andrew Bausch | Published Friday, November 01, 2013 | Last modified Monday, April 08, 2019

This model implements a Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma with the option to change whether agents interact deterministically or stochastically.

Previous work with the spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma has shown that “walk away” cooperators are able to outcompete defectors as well as cooperators that do not respond to defection, but it remains to be seen just how robust the so-called walk away strategy is to ecologically important variables such as population density, error, and offspring dispersal. Our simulation experiments identify socio-ecological conditions in which natural selection favors strategies that emphasize forgiveness over flight in the spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Our interesting results are best explained by considering how population density, error, and offspring dispersal affect the opportunity cost associated with walking away from an error-prone partner.

Spatial model of the noisy Prisoner's Dilemma with reward shift

Matus Halas | Published Thursday, March 05, 2015 | Last modified Tuesday, May 29, 2018

Interactions of players embedded in a closed square lattice are determined by distance and overall gains and they lead to shifts of reward payoff between temptation and punishment. A new winner balancing against threats is ultimately discovered.

Variations on the Ethnocentrism Model of Hammond and Axelrod

Fredrik Jansson | Published Saturday, November 10, 2012 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

Agents co-operate or defect towards other agents in a prisoner’s dilemma, with strategy choice depending on whether agents share tags or are kin in different social structures.

Agent-Based Model for the Evolution of Ethnocentrism

Max Hartshorn | Published Saturday, March 24, 2012 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This is an implementation of an agent based model for the evolution of ethnocentrism. While based off a model published by Hammond and Axelrod (2006), the code has been modified to allow for a more fine-grained analysis of evolutionary dynamics.

A spatial prisoner’s dilemma model with mobile agents, de-coupled birth-death events, and harsh environments.

Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Complex Networks with Agents' Adaptive Expectations

Bo Xianyu | Published Wednesday, November 16, 2011 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

This model studies the effect of the agents’ adaptive expectation on cooperation frequency in the prisoner’s dilemma game in complex networks from an agent based approach. The model is implemented in Repast simphony 1.2.

Displaying 10 of 12 results prisoner's dilemma clear filters

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