Norms@Risk ABM aim is to develop an explanation for the conditions under which people jointly take action to prevent disasters from happening, e.g. impacts from climate crisis, pandemic. The aim of the Norms@Risk work is to explore understudied dynamics between risk, social norms and cooperative behaviour and their role in overcoming collective threats. More specifically, Norms@Risk seeks to refine existing theory on cooperation by unpacking the role of collective risk interacting with social norms in ‘Collective Risk Social Dilemmas’*.

This simulation study takes on the next scientific iteration after a series of behavioural experiments. With the model we target to refine existing theory by capturing the heterogeneity in contributions that existing theories cannot fully explain as the behavioural responses are assumed to be more homogenous, particularly diversity regarding sensitivity to risk and norms.

*Collective Risk Social Dilemmas reflect a special type of social dilemma, unlike typical public goods, the collective risk dilemma involves individual contribution not to realise a gain, but to avoid a collective loss.

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A model to investigate the Evolution of Conditional Cooperation in a Spatial Public Goods Game. We consider two conditional cooperation strategies: one based on thresholds (Battu & Srinivasan, 2020) and another based on independent decisions for each number of cooperating neighbors. We examine the effects of productivity and conditional cooperation criteria on the trajectory of cooperation. Cooperation is evolving with no need for additional mechanisms apart from spatial structure when agents follow conditional strategies. We confirm the positive influence of productivity and cluster formation on the evolution of cooperation in spatial models. Results are robust for the two types of conditional cooperation strategies.

The purpose of the model is to provide an analogy for how the Schwartz values may influence the aggregated economic performance, as measured by: public goods provision, private goods provision and leisure time.

This is a set of threshold public goods games models. Set consists of baseline model, endogenous shared punishment model, endogenous shared punishment model with activists and cooperation model. In each round, all agents are granted a budget of size set in GUI. Then they decide on how much they contribute to public goods and how much they keep. Public goods are provided only if the sum of contributions meets or exceeds the threshold defined in the GUI. After each round agents evaluate their strategy and payoff from this strategy.

The Regional Security Game is a iterated public goods game with punishement based on based on life sciences work by Boyd et al. (2003 ) and Hintze & Adami (2015 ), with modifications appropriate for an international relations setting. The game models a closed regional system in which states compete over the distribution of common security benefits. Drawing on recent work applying cultural evolutionary paradigms in the social sciences, states learn through imitation of successful strategies rather than making instrumentally rational choices. The model includes the option to fit empirical data to the model, with two case studies included: Europe in 1933 on the verge of war and south-east Asia in 2013.

To our knowledge, this is the first agent-based simulation of continuous-time PGGs (where participants can change contributions at any time) which are much harder to realise within both laboratory and simulation environments.

Work related to this simulation has been published in the following journal article:
Vu, Tuong Manh, Wagner, Christian and Siebers, Peer-Olaf (2019) ‘ABOOMS: Overcoming the Hurdles of Continuous-Time Public Goods Games with a Simulation-Based Approach’ Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 22 (2) 7 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/22/2/7.html. doi: 10.18564/jasss.3995

Abstract:
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This model studies the emergence and dynamics of generalized trust. It does so by modeling agents that engage in trust games and, based on their experience, slowly determine whether others are, in general, trustworthy.

Dynamic bipartite network model of agents and games in which agents can participate in multiple public goods games.

This model simulates the heterogeneity of preferences in a PG game and how the interaction between them affects the dynamics of voluntary contributions. Model is based on the results of a human-based experiment.

This NetLogo model implements the Walk Away strategy in a spatial public goods game, where individuals have the ability to leave groups with insufficient levels of cooperation.