We present an agent-based model of worker protest informed by Epstein (2002). Workers have varying degrees of grievance depending on the difference between their wage and the average of their neighbors. They protest with probabilities proportional to grievance, but are inhibited by the risk of being arrested – which is determined by the ratio of coercive agents to probable rebels in the local area. We explore the effect of similarity perception on the dynamics of collective behavior. If […]

MASTOC is a replication of the Tragedy of the Commons by G. Hardin, programmed in NetLogo 4.0.4, based on behavioral game theory and Nash solution.

The model is used to study the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recogniz

This simulates the evolution of rules of shedding games based on cultural group selection. A number of groups play shedding games and evaluate the consequences on the average length and the difficulty

This model simulates 2048 versions of shedding games and evaluates the consequences on the average length and the difficulty of the game agents experience. The purpose of the model is to understand th

This model is a market game for evaluating the effectiveness of the UK government’s 2008-2010 policy on promoting smart metering in the UK retail electricity market. We break down the policy into four

A special case of the model ‘huntingforestry’, where a ‘pulsar’ pattern emerges, balancing hunting and game population growth.

In the model agents make decisions to contribute of not to the public good of a group, and cooperators may punish, at a cost, defectors. The model is based on group selection, and is used to understan