Computational Model Library

Displaying 10 of 117 results for "Nathan Ryan" clear search

We study three obstacles of the expansion of contract rice farming in the Mekong Delta (MKD) region. The failure of buyers in building trust-based relationship with small-holder farmers, unattractive offered prices from the contract farming scheme, and limited rice processing capacity have constrained contractors from participating in the large-scale paddy field program. We present an agent-based model to examine the viability of contract farming in the region from the contractor perspective.

The model focuses on financial incentives and trust, which affect the decision of relevant parties on whether to participate and honor a contract. The model is also designed in the context of the MKD’s rice supply chain with two contractors engaging in the contract rice farming scheme alongside an open market, in which both parties can renege on the agreement. We then evaluate the contractors’ performances with different combinations of scenarios related to the three obstacles.

Our results firstly show that a fully-equipped contractor who opportunistically exploits a relatively small proportion (less than 10%) of the contracted farmers in most instances can outperform spot market-based contractors in terms of average profit achieved for each crop. Secondly, a committed contractor who offers lower purchasing prices than the most typical rate can obtain better earnings per ton of rice as well as higher profit per crop. However, those contractors in both cases could not enlarge their contract farming scheme, since either farmers’ trust toward them decreases gradually or their offers are unable to compete with the benefits from a competitor or the spot market. Thirdly, the results are also in agreement with the existing literature that the contract farming scheme is not a cost-effective method for buyers with limited rice processing capacity, which is a common situation among the contractors in the MKD region.

This model simulates the propagation of photons in a water tank. A source of light emits an impulse of photons with equal energy represented by yellow dots. These photons are then scattered by water particles before possibly reaching the photo-detector represented by a gray line. Different types of water are considered. For each one of them we calculate the total received energy.

The water tank is represented by a blue rectangle with fixed dimensions. It’s exposed to the air interface and has totally absorbent barriers. Four types of water are supported. Each one is characterized by its absorption and scattering coefficients.
At the source, the photons are generated uniformly with a random direction within the beamwidth. Each photon travels a random distance drawn from a distribution depending on the water characteristics before encountering a water particle.
Based on the updated position of the photon, three situations may occur:
-The photon hits the barrier of the tank on its trajectory. In this case it’s considered as lost since the barriers are assumed totally absorbent.

Comparing agent-based models on experimental data of irrigation games

Marco Janssen Jacopo A. Baggio | Published Tuesday, July 02, 2013 | Last modified Wednesday, July 03, 2013

Comparing 7 alternative models of human behavior and assess their performance on a high resolution dataset based on individual behavior performance in laboratory experiments.

Walk This Way

Crooks Andrew Sarah Wise | Published Thursday, August 27, 2015

The purpose of this model is to enhance a basic ABM through a simple set of rules identified using the activity-driven models in order to produce more realistic patterns of pedestrian movement.

Like many developing countries, Nigeria is faced with a number of tradeoffs that pit rapid economic development against environmental preservation. Environmentally sustainable, “green” economic development is slower, more costly, and more difficult than unrestricted, unregulated economic growth. The mathematical model that we develop in this code suggests that widespread public awareness of environmental issues is insufficient to prevent the tendency towards sacrificing the environment for the sake of growth. Even if people have an understanding of negative impacts and always choose to act in their own self-interest, they may still act collectively in such a way as to bring down the quality of life for the entire society. We conclude that additional actions must be taken besides raising public awareness of the environmental problem.

Last Mile Commuter Behavior Model

Dean Massey Moira Zellner Yoram Shiftan Jonathan Levine Maria Arquero | Published Friday, November 07, 2014 | Last modified Friday, November 07, 2014

We represent commuters and their preferences for transportation cost, time and safety. Agents assess their options via their preferences, their environment, and the modes available. The model has policy levers to test impact on last-mile problem.

This model was design to test parameters that affects the number of people shot during mass shooting. This basic formulation places a gunman in a crowd and allows the users to manipulate parameters of the gunman.

Replication of ECEC model: Environmental Feedback and the Evolution of Cooperation

Pierre Bommel | Published Tuesday, April 05, 2011 | Last modified Saturday, April 27, 2013

The model, presented here, is a re-implementation of the Pepper and Smuts’ model : - Pepper, J.W. and B.B. Smuts. 2000. “The evolution of cooperation in an ecological context: an agent-based model”. Pp. 45-76 in T.A. Kohler and G.J. Gumerman, eds. Dynamics of human and primate societies: agent-based modeling of social and spatial processes. Oxford University Press, Oxford. - Pepper, J.W. and B.B. Smuts. 2002. “Assortment through Environmental Feedback”. American Naturalist, 160: 205-213 […]

Takács, K. and Squazzoni, F. 2015. High Standards Enhance Inequality in Idealized Labor Markets. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 18(4), 2, http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/18/4/2.html
We built a simple model of an idealized labor market, in which there is no objective difference in average quality between groups and hiring decisions are not biased in favor of any particular group. Our results show that inequality in employment emerges necessarily also in such idealized situations due to the limited supply of high quality individuals and asymmetric information. Inequalities are exacerbated when employers have high standards and keep only the best workers in house. We found that ambitious workers get higher quality jobs even if ambition does not correlate or even negatively correlates with internal quality. Our findings help to corroborate empirical findings on higher employment discrepancies in high rather than low status jobs.

Displaying 10 of 117 results for "Nathan Ryan" clear search

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