We develop an agent-based model for collective behavior of routine medical check-ups, and specifically dental visits, in a social network.

A model for simulating the evolution of individual’s preferences, incliding adaptive agents “falsifying” -as public opinions- their own preferences. It was builded to describe, explore, experiment and understand how simple heuristics can modulate global opinion dynamics. So far two mechanisms are implemented: a version of Festiguer’s reduction of cognitive disonance, and a version of Goffman’s impression management. In certain social contexts -minority, social rank presure- some models agents can “fake” its public opinion while keeping internally the oposite preference, but after a number of rounds following this falsifying behaviour pattern, a coherence principle can change the real or internal preferences close to that expressed in public.

This computational model accompanies the article “The Informational Assumptions of Schelling Segregation: An Agent-Based Decomposition of Cue Inference, Cultural Schemas, and Residential Sorting.” It implements an agent-based model in which agents infer latent neighborhood-type classes from noisy non-demographic cues through schema-specific diagnostic mappings, update beliefs, and relocate when satisfaction on a preferred latent class falls below a threshold.

The model serves as a mechanism-isolation device for studying the informational architecture underlying Schelling-style residential sorting. It includes the principal sweep configuration (14,400 runs across a seven-parameter grid), a disagreement-metric sub-sweep with permutation-minimized Jensen-Shannon divergence recorded natively, controls (positive, negative, and frozen-belief), a paired-seed cue-channel perturbation experiment, and selected-cell sensitivity sweeps for cue persistence and home-biased mobility.

The full ODD protocol, parameter manifests, deterministic seed schedules, processed outputs, regenerable figure scripts, the verification test suite, and the satisfaction-mapping audit document are included. Every reported run is deterministic given a (config, seed) pair, and an included audit script verifies bit-for-bit replay on sampled runs.

This model implements a Bayesian belief revision model that contrasts an ideal agent in possesion of true likelihoods, an agent using a fixed estimate of trusting its source of information, and an agent updating its trust estimate.

The purpose of this model is to explore the effects of different power structures on a cross-functional team’s prosocial decision making. Are certain power distributions more conducive to the team making prosocial decisions?

The purpose of this model is to study the evolution of cooperation when agents are endowed with a limited set of receptors, a set of elementary actions and a neural network agents use to make decision

Pandemic (pip install pandemic)

An agent model in which commuting, compliance, testing and contagion parameters drive infection in a population of thousands of millions. Agents follow Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes in the plane and collisions drive transmission. Results are stored at SwarmPrediction.com for further analysis, and can be retrieved by anyone.

This is a very simple simulation that in a special case can be shown to be approximated by a compartmental model with time varying infection rate.

A multi-agent model of oligarchy in a spatial election simulation.

This model accompanies a paper looking at the role and limits of values and norms for modeling realistic social agents. Based on literature we synthesize a theory on norms and a theory that combines both values and norms. In contrast to previous work, these theories are checked against data on human behavior obtained from a psychological experiment on dividing money: the ultimatum game. We found that agents that act according to a theory that combines both values and norms, produce behavior quite similar to that of humans. Furthermore, we found that this theory is more realistic than theories solely concerned with norms or theories solely concerned with values. However, to explain the amount of money people accept in this ultimatum game we will eventually need an even more realistic theory. We propose that a theory that explains when people exactly choose to use norms instead of values could provide this realism.

We propose an agent-based model leading to a decrease or an increase of hostility between agents after a major cultural threat such as a terrorist attack. The model is inspired from the Terror Management Theory and the Social Judgement Theory. An agent has a cultural identity defined through its acceptance segments about each of three different cultural worldviews (i.e., Atheist, Muslim, Christian) of the considered society. An agent’s acceptance segment is composed from its acceptable positions toward a cultural worldview, including its most acceptable position. An agent forms an attitude about another agent depending on the similarity between their cultural identities. When a terrorist attack is perpetrated in the name of an extreme cultural identity, the negatively perceived agents from this extreme cultural identity point of view tend to decrease the width of their acceptance segments in order to differentiate themselves more from the threatening cultural identity