The Price Evolution with Expectations model provides the opportunity to explore the question of non-equilibrium market dynamics, and how and under which conditions an economic system converges to the classically defined economic equilibrium. To accomplish this, we bring together two points of view of the economy; the classical perspective of general equilibrium theory and an evolutionary perspective, in which the current development of the economic system determines the possibilities for further evolution.

The Price Evolution with Expectations model consists of a representative firm producing no profit but producing a single good, which we call sugar, and a representative household which provides labour to the firm and purchases sugar.The model explores the evolutionary dynamics whereby the firm does not initially know the household demand but eventually this demand and thus the correct price for sugar given the household’s optimal labour.

The model can be run in one of two ways; the first does not include money and the second uses money such that the firm and/or the household have an endowment that can be spent or saved. In either case, the household has preferences for leisure and consumption and a demand function relating sugar and price, and the firm has a production function and learns the household demand over a set number of time steps using either an endogenous or exogenous learning algorithm. The resulting equilibria, or fixed points of the system, may or may not match the classical economic equilibrium.

The network-based trust game is a hybridization of both the repeated trust games and the network games.

The MOBILITY model analyzes how agents’ mobility affects the performance of social-ecological systems in different landscape configurations.

This model can be used to optimize intervention strategies for inspection services.

This model converts cleaned up versions of .pgn files (records of real chess games) and conversts them into files that record all of the events and “possible” events within a game of chess. This is intended to be a way to create sets of data that capture event sequences within the relatively complex but finite context of chess games as a proxy or “toy” data set. Although not a perfect correlation, these toy data sets are a first step in analysing complex and dynamic systems of events and possible events that happen in the real world.

The Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice (GCM) is a fundamental model of organizational decision-making originally propossed by J.D. Cohen, J.G. March and J.P. Olsen in 1972. In their model, decisions are made out of random meetings of decision-makers, opportunities, solutions and problems within an organization.
With this model, these very same agents are supposed to meet in society at large where they make decisions according to GCM rules. Furthermore, under certain additional conditions decision-makers, opportunities, solutions and problems form stable organizations. In this artificial ecology organizations are born, grow and eventually vanish with time.

Urban greenery such as vertical greenery systems (VGS) can effectively absorb air pollutants emitted by different agents, such as vehicles and manufacturing enterprises. The main challenge is how to protect socially important objects, such as kindergartens, from the influence if air pollution with the minimum of expenditure. There is proposed the hybrid individual- and particle-based model of interactions between vertical greenery systems and air pollutants to identify optimal locations of tree clusters and high-rise buildings where horizontal greenery systems and VGS should be implemented, respectively. The model is implemented in the AnyLogic simulation tool.

Model of shifting cultivation. All parameters can be controlled by the user or the model can be run in adaptive mode, in which agents innovate and select parameters.

Amidst the global trend of increasing market concentration, this paper examines the role of finance
in shaping it. Using Agent-Based Modeling (ABM), we analyze the impact of financial policies on market concentration
and its closely related variables: economic growth and labor income share. We extend the Keynes
meets Schumpeter (K+S) model by incorporating two critical assumptions that influence market concentration.
Policy experiments are conducted with a model validated against historical trends in South Korea. For policy
variables, the Debt-to-Sales Ratio (DSR) limit and interest rate are used as levers to regulate the quantity and
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A road freight transport (RFT) operation involves the participation of several types of companies in its execution. The TRANSOPE model simulates the subcontracting process between 3 types of companies: Freight Forwarders (FF), Transport Companies (TC) and self-employed carriers (CA). These companies (agents) form transport outsourcing chains (TOCs) by making decisions based on supplier selection criteria and transaction acceptance criteria. Through their participation in TOCs, companies are able to learn and exchange information, so that knowledge becomes another important factor in new collaborations. The model can replicate multiple subcontracting situations at a local and regional geographic level.
The succession of n operations over d days provides two types of results: 1) Social Complex Networks, and 2) Spatial knowledge accumulation environments. The combination of these results is used to identify the emergence of new logistics clusters. The types of actors involved as well as the variables and parameters used have their justification in a survey of transport experts and in the existing literature on the subject.
As a result of a preferential selection process, the distribution of activity among agents shows to be highly uneven. The cumulative network resulting from the self-organisation of the system suggests a structure similar to scale-free networks (Albert & Barabási, 2001). In this sense, new agents join the network according to the needs of the market. Similarly, the network of preferential relationships persists over time. Here, knowledge transfer plays a key role in the assignment of central connector roles, whose participation in the outsourcing network is even more decisive in situations of scarcity of transport contracts.