Károly Takács

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Károly Takács

Institution

MTA TK "Lendület" Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (RECENS), Budapest

Personal homepage

http://web.uni-corvinus.hu/~tkaroly

Professional homepage

http://recens.tk.mta.hu/en

ORCID more info

No associated orcid account.

GitHub more info

No associated github account.

No bio entered.

Research Interests

My main research interests are the theoretical and experimental analysis of the dynamics of social networks, in relation to problems of cooperation and conflict.

This model aims to demonstrate that searching for the best options in the labor market does not result in efficient and fair outcomes, as many economists believe.

This model aims to demonstrate that searching for the best options in the labor market does not result in efficient and fair outcomes, as many economists believe.

Takács, K. and Squazzoni, F. 2015. High Standards Enhance Inequality in Idealized Labor Markets. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 18(4), 2, http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/18/4/2.html
We built a simple model of an idealized labor market, in which there is no objective difference in average quality between groups and hiring decisions are not biased in favor of any particular group. Our results show that inequality in employment emerges necessarily also in such idealized situations due to the limited supply of high quality individuals and asymmetric information. Inequalities are exacerbated when employers have high standards and keep only the best workers in house. We found that ambitious workers get higher quality jobs even if ambition does not correlate or even negatively correlates with internal quality. Our findings help to corroborate empirical findings on higher employment discrepancies in high rather than low status jobs.

Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity

Simone Righi Károly Takács | Published Sat Jun 9 14:14:48 2018 | Last modified Sat Jun 9 15:11:49 2018

Righi S., Takacs K., Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity, Resubmitted after Revisions to Scientific Reports

We model interpersonal dynamics and study behavior in the classroom in the hypothetical case of a single teacher who defines students’ seating arrangements. The model incorporates the mechanisms of peer influence on study behavior, on attitude formation, and homophilous selection in order to depict the interrelated dynamics of networks, behavior, and attitudes. We compare various seating arrangement scenarios and observe how GPA distribution and level of prejudice changes over time.

Under development.

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