The model simulates the evolution of the labor market in the context of the PNRR (National Recovery and Resilience Plan). It tracks how two types of agents (angajati and neangajati) develop their professional competencies to match the requirements of seven distinct job categories.
The simulation focuses on the gap between current skill levels and market demands, specifically modeling how a sudden “Market Shift” (the introduction of a 13th competency) impacts the workforce’s readiness.

Organizations operate under conditions of imperfect performance in which human error is inevitable, yet errors are rarely examined as the triggers for the managerial interactions that shape organizational culture over time. The present research introduces an agent-based simulation of a work team completing a fixed sequence of tasks under varying degrees of managerial oversight and response policy. The model isolates the mechanical loss of throughput caused by errors from the psychological and cultural consequences of managerial reactions, which are categorized into ignoring, correcting or punishing. Furthermore, the model incorporates an autonomous self-notice mechanism, allowing workers to correct themselves in the absence of managerial intervention. By tracking the accumulation of worker resentment and the transient enhancements in learning, the simulation acts as a dynamic laboratory for observing delayed consequences, nonlinear tipping points and systemic organizational collapse. The results reveal a central paradox of organizational control. Highly monitored punitive environments generate high short-term throughput, yet they simultaneously accumulate interactional injustice and resentment that engineer a rapid cascading turnover and the highest probability of systemic collapse. Conversely, corrective policies combined with active monitoring achieve equivalent throughput while sustaining workforce viability. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis establishes that error accumulation is primarily determined by structural factors, namely agent-level mistake propensity and task difficulty, while resignation dynamics, resentment accumulation and collapse timing remain predominantly governed by managerial policy, a hierarchy independently corroborated by a surrogate model and shown to be stable across independent seeds and across stakeholder weighting scenarios. The study bridges the operational mechanics of task completion and the social dynamics of workplace mistreatment, illustrating how short-term punitive success often masks long-term structural fragility.

SERDUX-MARCIM simulates the propagation of a cyberattack over the computational network of an organization in the maritime sector, at the strategic level of decision-making. It is the instantiation of ABM-MARCIM, the agent-based model of the MARCIM framework for the modeling and simulation of maritime cyberdefense.

Every computational asset of the target organization – servers, endpoints, routers, gateways, vessel systems, radars – is an agent that occupies one of six states at each time step: Susceptible, Exposed, Resistant, Degraded, Unavailable or Destroyed, the initials of which give the model its name. The states Degraded, Unavailable and Destroyed are associated with the D5 cyberattack effects (disrupt, degrade, deny, destroy, deceive) as a function of the degree and the duration of the attack. Thirteen transitions between states are admissible.

Unlike a conventional agent-based model, the local update function is not an individual behavioral rule. It is a system of six ordinary differential equations with eight time-dependent transition rates – propagation, cyberattack (degraded), cyberattack (unavailable), cyberattack (destroyed), recovery, sanitation, loss of resistance, and unavailability by other causes. The values of those rates derive from the capabilities of the target organization, the capabilities of the attacker, and the degree and duration of the cyberattack, computed through a cyber risk approach aligned with the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology, the ISACA categorization of security controls and the IMO Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management.

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Agent-based model simulating 60 undergraduate CS students over 8 semesters to investigate how differential AI tool access affects academic inequality, performance distributions, and dependency formation. Implements a three-phase AI dependency mechanism (effort reduction, metacognitive miscalibration, capability erosion) under five policy scenarios with a 4,050-run parameter sensitivity sweep.

This model is an agent-based simulation designed to explore how climate-induced environmental degradation can contribute to the emergence of social violence in coastal communities that depend heavily on ecosystem services for their livelihoods. The model represents a coupled social–ecological system in which environmental shocks—such as sea level rise and marine ecosystem decline—affect local economic conditions, food security, and community stability.

Agents in the model represent individuals whose livelihoods depend on coastal ecosystems. Environmental degradation reduces ecosystem productivity and increases economic hardship, which can lead to the formation of grievances among agents. The model incorporates behavioral thresholds that determine how individuals respond to hardship and perceived injustice. Under certain conditions—particularly when institutional capacity and law enforcement effectiveness are limited—these grievances may escalate into violent behavior.

The simulation allows users to explore how different climate scenarios, levels of ecosystem degradation, livelihood dependence, and institutional responses influence the probability of social instability and violence. By modeling the interactions between environmental stress, socio-economic vulnerability, and governance capacity, the model provides a computational framework for examining potential pathways linking climate change and conflict in coastal social–ecological systems.

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Negotiation plays a fundamental role in shaping human societies, underpinning conflict resolution, institutional design, and economic coordination. This article introduces E³-MAN, a novel multi-agent model for negotiation that integrates individual utility maximization with fairness and institutional legitimacy. Unlike classical approaches grounded solely in game theory, our model incorporates Bayesian opponent modeling, transfer learning from past negotiation domains, and fallback institutional rules to resolve deadlocks. Agents interact in dynamic environments characterized by strategic heterogeneity and asymmetric information, negotiating over multidimensional issues under time constraints. Through extensive simulation experiments, we compare E³-MAN against the Nash bargaining solution and equal-split baselines using key performance metrics: utilitarian efficiency, Nash social welfare, Jain fairness index, Gini coefficient, and institutional compliance. Results show that E³-MAN achieves near-optimal efficiency while significantly improving distributive equity and agreement stability. A legal application simulating multilateral labor arbitration demonstrates that institutional default rules foster more balanced outcomes and increase negotiation success rates from 58% to 98%. By combining computational intelligence with normative constraints, this work contributes to the growing field of socially aware autonomous agents. It offers a virtual laboratory for exploring how simple institutional interventions can enhance justice, cooperation, and robustness in complex socio-legal systems.

The agent-based simulation of innovation diffusion is based on the idea of the Bass model (1969).

The adoption of an agent is driven two parameters: its innovativess p and its prospensity to conform with others. The model is designed for a computational experiment building up on the following four model variations:

(i) the agent population it fully connected and all agents share the same parameter values for p and q
(ii) the agent population it fully connected and agents are heterogeneous, i.e. individual parameter values are drawn from a normal distribution
(iii) the agents population is embeded in a social network and all agents share the same parameter values for p and q
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This research aims to uncover the micro-mechanisms that drive the macro-level relationship between cultural tolerance and innovation. We focus on the indirect influence of minorities—specifically, workers with diverse domain expertise—within collaboration networks. We propose that minority influence from individuals with different expertise can serve as a key driver of organizational innovation, particularly in dynamic market environments, and that cultural tolerance is critical for enabling such minority-induced innovation. Our model demonstrates that seemingly conflicting empirical patterns between cultural tightness/looseness and innovation can emerge from the same underlying micro-mechanisms, depending on parameter values. A systematic simulation experiment revealed an optimal cultural configuration: a medium level of tolerance (t = 0.6) combined with low consistency (κ = 0.05) produced the fastest adaptation to abrupt market changes. These findings provide evidence that indirect minority influence is a core micro-mechanism linking cultural tolerance to innovation.

The Agent-Based Model for Multiple Team Membership (ABMMTM) simulates design teams searching for viable design solutions, for a large design project that requires multiple design teams that are working simultaneously, under different organizational structures; specifically, the impact of multiple team membership (MTM). The key mechanism under study is how individual agent-level decision-making impacts macro-level project performance, specifically, wage cost. Each agent follows a stochastic learning approach, akin to simulated annealing or reinforcement learning, where they iteratively explore potential design solutions. The agent evaluates new solutions based on a random-walk exploration, accepting improvements while rejecting inferior designs. This iterative process simulates real-world problem-solving dynamics where designers refine solutions based on feedback.

As a proof-of-concept demonstration of assessing the macro-level effects of MTM in organizational design, we developed this agent-based simulation model which was used in a simulation experiment. The scenario is a system design project involving multiple interdependent teams of engineering designers. In this scenario, the required system design is split into three separate but interdependent systems, e.g., the design of a satellite could (trivially) be split into three components: power source, control system, and communication systems; each of three design team is in charge of a design of one of these components. A design team is responsible for ensuring its proposed component’s design meets the design requirement; they are not responsible for the design requirements of the other components. If the design of a given component does not affect the design requirements of the other components, we call this the uncoupled scenario; otherwise, it is a coupled scenario.

This repository contains an agent-based simulation model exploring how status hierarchies influence the emergence and sustainability of cooperation in task-oriented groups. The model builds on evolutionary game theory to examine the dynamics of cooperation under single-leader and multi-leader hierarchies, investigating factors such as group size, assortativity, and hierarchical clarity. Key findings highlight the trade-offs between different leadership structures in fostering group cooperation and reveal the conditions under which cooperation is most stable.

The repository includes code for simulations, numerical analysis scripts, and visualization tools to replicate the results presented in the manuscript titled “Status hierarchies and the emergence of cooperation in task groups.”

Feel free to explore, reproduce the findings, or adapt the model for further research!