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This model compares rules for allocating a fixed budget of opportunity (places, training, funding) among people who differ in potential and will. Each agent’s effective potential, its denatotita, is potential multiplied by will. Realisation is denatotita multiplied by the opportunity received, and an agent succeeds when realisation reaches a threshold. Nine allocation regimes are compared: equal shares; shares proportional to denatotita; three threshold rules that reclaim and redistribute the allocations of those who would fail; an efficient benchmark that maximises successes; and three forward-looking rules (foresight, will-aware foresight and hindsight). A mixed regime blends targeting with equal shares. Over time, opportunity develops potential through a skill-formation technology, and will rises with success and falls when an agent is passed over. The model reproduces the article’s results: a closed-form crossover between equal and proportional allocation; a reversal in favour of broad allocation when development is productive; a hollowing-out of potential under success-maximising allocation; and the failure of mixtures of targeting and equal shares. Written in Python (NumPy, pandas, Matplotlib), with fixed random seeds so results are exactly reproducible.
This model extends Schelling’s segregation model with mobility sharing. Agents of two groups occupy cells of a 32 × 32 grid and repeatedly choose activity destinations subject to a preference threshold, the minimum share of ingroup neighbours they accept. Trips are matched into shared rides between members of different groups, using one of four matching algorithms on a shareability network (maximal cross-group matching, maximum weight matching on contact time, maximum cardinality matching, or random greedy matching) with a maximum detour constraint. After each trip, an agent’s preference threshold changes with the time spent in contact with outgroup members.
Starting from complete segregation, the model examines under which conditions contact during shared trips leads to integration. Besides the main scenario, in which contact always lowers the threshold, it includes two extensions. In the first, a share of adversarial agents becomes less tolerant with contact, and this share grows or shrinks with the current level of segregation, governed by a branching dissimilarity index and a conversion rate. In the second, each contact raises or lowers the threshold with a probability that depends on the agent’s current attitude relative to a compatibility threshold.
Segregation is measured with the index of dissimilarity and the Gini coefficient. The model file includes BehaviorSpace experiments for each analysis in the associated article. The matching step uses the NetworkX library through the Python extension of NetLogo (requires Python 3 with numpy and networkx 3.x).
GFN & Technology Models Library (2025–2035) is a collection of four interrelated computational models focused on global financial networks, cascading default risks, technological development, and technological lag, with particular attention to Russia, the USA, and China. The library combines agent-based modeling, system dynamics, Monte-Carlo simulation, and network analysis. It includes: (1) a Numba-accelerated Monte-Carlo technology index model; (2) a hybrid GFN + cascading defaults (Gai–Kapadia) + Russian system dynamics model; (3) a twin-simulation GFN+SBS framework with selective bailout and Russia’s peripheral position; and (4) an endogenous GFN model with technology centrality, dependence, and tech lag dynamics under sanctions scenarios. GFN & Technology Models Library (2025–2035) is a collection of four interrelated computational models focused on global financial networks, cascading default risks, technological development, and technological lag, with particular attention to Russia, the USA, and China.
The library combines agent-based modeling, system dynamics, Monte-Carlo simulation, and network analysis. It includes:
SERDUX-MARCIM simulates the propagation of a cyberattack over the computational network of an organization in the maritime sector, at the strategic level of decision-making. It is the instantiation of ABM-MARCIM, the agent-based model of the MARCIM framework for the modeling and simulation of maritime cyberdefense.
Every computational asset of the target organization – servers, endpoints, routers, gateways, vessel systems, radars – is an agent that occupies one of six states at each time step: Susceptible, Exposed, Resistant, Degraded, Unavailable or Destroyed, the initials of which give the model its name. The states Degraded, Unavailable and Destroyed are associated with the D5 cyberattack effects (disrupt, degrade, deny, destroy, deceive) as a function of the degree and the duration of the attack. Thirteen transitions between states are admissible.
Unlike a conventional agent-based model, the local update function is not an individual behavioral rule. It is a system of six ordinary differential equations with eight time-dependent transition rates – propagation, cyberattack (degraded), cyberattack (unavailable), cyberattack (destroyed), recovery, sanitation, loss of resistance, and unavailability by other causes. The values of those rates derive from the capabilities of the target organization, the capabilities of the attacker, and the degree and duration of the cyberattack, computed through a cyber risk approach aligned with the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology, the ISACA categorization of security controls and the IMO Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management.
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