The model is used to study the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recognize the trustworthiness of their opponents. When the agents display a number of symbols and they learn which symbols are important to estimate the trustworthiness of others, agents will evolve who cooperate in games.
|Version||Submitter||First published||Last modified||Status|
|1.3.0||Marco Janssen||Wed Nov 13 23:46:20 2013||Wed Nov 13 23:46:20 2013||Published|
|1.2.0||Marco Janssen||Wed Oct 24 14:37:30 2012||Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013||Published|
|1.1.0||Marco Janssen||Wed Oct 17 05:19:37 2012||Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013||Published|
|1.0.0||Marco Janssen||Fri Oct 15 20:05:27 2010||Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013||Published|