Computational Model Library

This release is out-of-date. The latest version is 1.3.0

Evolution of cooperation with strangers (version 1.2.0)

The model is used to study the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recognize the trustworthiness of their opponents. When the agents display a number of symbols and they learn which symbols are important to estimate the trustworthiness of others, agents will evolve who cooperate in games.

Version Submitter First published Last modified Status
1.3.0 Marco Janssen Wed Nov 13 23:46:20 2013 Wed Nov 13 23:46:20 2013 Published
1.2.0 Marco Janssen Wed Oct 24 14:37:30 2012 Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013 Published
1.1.0 Marco Janssen Wed Oct 17 05:19:37 2012 Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013 Published
1.0.0 Marco Janssen Fri Oct 15 20:05:27 2010 Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013 Published


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