The model is used to study the conditions under which agents will cooperate in one-shot two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games if they are able to withdraw from playing the game and can learn to recognize the trustworthiness of their opponents. When the agents display a number of symbols and they learn which symbols are important to estimate the trustworthiness of others, agents will evolve who cooperate in games.
Version | Submitter | First published | Last modified | Status |
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1.3.0 | Marco Janssen | Wed Nov 13 23:46:20 2013 | Wed Nov 13 23:46:20 2013 | Published |
1.2.0 | Marco Janssen | Wed Oct 24 14:37:30 2012 | Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013 | Published |
1.1.0 | Marco Janssen | Wed Oct 17 05:19:37 2012 | Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013 | Published |
1.0.0 | Marco Janssen | Fri Oct 15 20:05:27 2010 | Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013 | Published |