MASTOC-LLM extends the classic Multi-Agent System Tragedy of the Commons (MASTOC) model by replacing hard-coded behavioral rules with autonomous decision-making powered by large language models (LLMs). Three heterogeneous agents manage herds of cows on a shared grassland commons. Each tick, an agent receives a structured prompt describing current resource levels, its own herd size, peer behavior, and — optionally — a rolling memory of recent rounds and messages from neighboring agents. The LLM returns a stocking decision (add, remove, or hold cows) together with a natural-language rationale and, when communication is enabled, a short message to broadcast to peers.

The model is designed to test whether LLM agents spontaneously develop Ostrom-style common-pool resource governance (mutual monitoring, graduated sanctions, graduated rule revision) or instead fall into identifiable failure modes. Preliminary experiments with Claude Haiku 4.5, GPT-5.4-mini, and DeepSeek R1:32b have revealed four recurring collapse patterns — Cooperative Paralysis, Defection Cascade, Overshoot-Panic, and Hybrid Architecture Failure — whose onset timing is sensitive to memory length, inter-agent communication, and the post-training alignment approach of the underlying model.

MASTOC-LLM is intended as a laboratory for generative agent-based modelling (GABM) methodology: it provides a clean, well-understood commons baseline against which LLM behavioral hypotheses can be systematically tested and compared across models, parameter sweeps, and alignment regimes.

Negotiation plays a fundamental role in shaping human societies, underpinning conflict resolution, institutional design, and economic coordination. This article introduces E³-MAN, a novel multi-agent model for negotiation that integrates individual utility maximization with fairness and institutional legitimacy. Unlike classical approaches grounded solely in game theory, our model incorporates Bayesian opponent modeling, transfer learning from past negotiation domains, and fallback institutional rules to resolve deadlocks. Agents interact in dynamic environments characterized by strategic heterogeneity and asymmetric information, negotiating over multidimensional issues under time constraints. Through extensive simulation experiments, we compare E³-MAN against the Nash bargaining solution and equal-split baselines using key performance metrics: utilitarian efficiency, Nash social welfare, Jain fairness index, Gini coefficient, and institutional compliance. Results show that E³-MAN achieves near-optimal efficiency while significantly improving distributive equity and agreement stability. A legal application simulating multilateral labor arbitration demonstrates that institutional default rules foster more balanced outcomes and increase negotiation success rates from 58% to 98%. By combining computational intelligence with normative constraints, this work contributes to the growing field of socially aware autonomous agents. It offers a virtual laboratory for exploring how simple institutional interventions can enhance justice, cooperation, and robustness in complex socio-legal systems.