Fertility Tradeoffs is an agent-based model that examines how parental investment strategies evolve under density-dependent conditions. Humans occupy territories that compete for limited space, and reproduction requires both resources and available territory. Individuals inherit investment strategies that determine how much time and resources are required to raise a child, creating a tradeoff between number of children and investment per child. As space fills, territory costs increase and population growth slows, producing logistic-like dynamics. By manipulating child mortality and resource availability, the model demonstrates how environmental conditions shape both population outcomes and the evolution of reproductive strategies.

The set of models test how receivers ability to accurately rank signalers under various ecological and behavioral contexts.

The model implements a double auction financial markets with two types of agents: rational and noise. The model aims to study the impact of different compensation structure on the market stability and market quantities as prices, volumes, spreads.

The purpose of the model is to better understand, how different factors for human residential choices affect the city’s segregation pattern. Therefore, a Schelling (1971) model was extended to include ethnicity, income, and affordability and applied to the city of Salzburg. So far, only a few studies have tried to explore the effect of multiple factors on the residential pattern (Sahasranaman & Jensen, 2016, 2018; Yin, 2009). Thereby, models using multiple factors can produce more realistic results (Benenson et al., 2002). This model and the corresponding thesis aim to fill that gap.

In this paper we introduce an agent-based model of elections and government formation where voters do not have perfect knowledge about the parties’ ideological position. Although voters are boundedly rational, they are forward-looking in that they try to assess the likely impact of the different parties over the resulting government. Thus, their decision rules combine sincere and strategic voting: they form preferences about the different parties but deem some of them as inadmissible and try to block them from office. We find that the most stable and durable coalition governments emerge at intermediate levels of informational ambiguity. When voters have very poor information about the parties, their votes are scattered too widely, preventing the emergence of robust majorities. But also, voters with highly precise perceptions about the parties will cluster around tiny electoral niches with a similar aggregate effect.

This model aims to understand the interaction between particulate matter and leaves of trees. The particles collide with the leaf and can either be absorbed with a certain probability, otherwise they bounce off it. The absorptions are detected in a counter.
The movement of the particles depends mainly on the strength and direction of the wind and the air temperature. They also show a certain random movement, but the proportion is negligible.
In a collision with the leaf, the particles are absorbed with a certain probability (absorption-probability), otherwise repelled.

The rapid environmental changes currently underway in many dry regions of the world, and the deep uncertainty about their consequences, underscore a critical challenge for sustainability: how to maintain cooperation that ensures the provision of natural resources when the benefits of cooperating are variable, sometimes uncertain, and often limited. We present an agent-based model that simulates the economic decisions of households to engage, or not, in labor-sharing agreements under different scenarios of water supply, water variability, and socio-environmental risk. We formulate the model to investigate the consequences of environmental variability on the fate of labor-sharing agreements between farmers. The economic decisions were implemented in the framework of prospect theory.

Agers and non-agers agent compete over a spatial landscape. When two agents occupy the same grid, who will survive is decided by a random draw where chances of survival are proportional to fitness. Agents have offspring each time step who are born at a distance b from the parent agent and the offpring inherits their genetic fitness plus a random term. Genetic fitness decreases with time, representing environmental change but effective non-inheritable fitness can increase as animals learn and get bigger.

The network-based trust game is a hybridization of both the repeated trust games and the network games.

Status-power dynamics on a playground, resulting in a status landscape with a gender status gap. Causal: individual (beauty, kindness, power), binary (rough-and-tumble; has-been-nice) or prior popularity (status). Cultural: acceptability of fighting.