The targeted subsidies plan model is based on the economic concept of targeted subsidies.

The targeted subsidies plan model simulates the distribution of subsidies among households in a community over several years. The model assumes that the government allocates a fixed amount of money each year for the purpose of distributing cash subsidies to eligible households. The eligible households are identified by dividing families into 10 groups based on their income, property, and wealth. The subsidy is distributed to the first four groups, with the first group receiving the highest subsidy amount. The model simulates the impact of the subsidy distribution process on the income and property of households in the community over time.

The model simulates a community of 230 households, each with a household income and wealth that follows a power-law distribution. The number of household members is modeled by a normal distribution. The model allocates a fixed amount of money each year for the purpose of distributing cash subsidies among eligible households. The eligible households are identified by dividing families into 10 groups based on their income, property, and wealth. The subsidy is distributed to the first four groups, with the first group receiving the highest subsidy amount.
The model runs for a period of 10 years, with the subsidy distribution process occurring every month. The subsidy received by each household is assumed to be spent, and a small portion may be saved and added to the household’s property. At the end of each year, the grouping of households based on income and assets is redone, and a number of families may be moved from one group to another based on changes in their income and property.
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The Inspection Model represents a basic food safety system where inspectors, consumers and stores interact. The purpose of the model is to provide insight into an optimal level of inspectors in a food system by comparing three search strategies.

The Inspection Model represents a basic food safety system where inspectors, consumers and stores interact. The purpose of the model is to provide insight into an optimal level of inspectors in a food system by comparing three search strategies.

The Inspection Model represents a basic food safety system where inspectors, consumers and stores interact. The purpose of the model is to provide insight into an optimal level of inspectors in a food system by comparing three search strategies.

This model examines the potential impact of market collapse on the economy and demography of fishing households in the Logone Floodplain, Cameroon.

This model is an agent-based simulation designed to explore how climate-induced environmental degradation can contribute to the emergence of social violence in coastal communities that depend heavily on ecosystem services for their livelihoods. The model represents a coupled social–ecological system in which environmental shocks—such as sea level rise and marine ecosystem decline—affect local economic conditions, food security, and community stability.

Agents in the model represent individuals whose livelihoods depend on coastal ecosystems. Environmental degradation reduces ecosystem productivity and increases economic hardship, which can lead to the formation of grievances among agents. The model incorporates behavioral thresholds that determine how individuals respond to hardship and perceived injustice. Under certain conditions—particularly when institutional capacity and law enforcement effectiveness are limited—these grievances may escalate into violent behavior.

The simulation allows users to explore how different climate scenarios, levels of ecosystem degradation, livelihood dependence, and institutional responses influence the probability of social instability and violence. By modeling the interactions between environmental stress, socio-economic vulnerability, and governance capacity, the model provides a computational framework for examining potential pathways linking climate change and conflict in coastal social–ecological systems.

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Country-by-Country Reporting and Automatic Exchange of Information have recently been implemented in European Union (EU) countries. These international tax reforms increase tax compliance in the short term. In the long run, however, taxpayers will continue looking abroad to avoid taxation and, countries, looking for additional revenues, will provide opportunities. As a result, tax competition intensifies and the initial increase in compliance could reverse. To avoid international tax reforms being counteracted by tax competition, this paper suggests bilateral responsive regulation to maximize compliance. This implies that countries would use different tax policy instruments toward other countries, including tax and secrecy havens.

To assess the effectiveness of fully or partially enforce tax policies, this agent based model has been ran many times under different enforcement rules, which influence the perceived enforced- and voluntary compliance, as the slippery-slope model prescribes. Based on the dynamics of this perception and the extent to which agents influence each other, the annual amounts of tax evasion, tax avoidance and taxes paid are calculated over longer periods of time.

The agent-based simulation finds that a differentiated policy response could increase tax compliance by 6.54 percent, which translates into an annual increase of €105 billion in EU tax revenues on income, profits, and capital gains. Corporate income tax revenues in France, Spain, and the UK alone would already account for €35 billion.

The model explores the impact of public disclosure on tax compliance among diverse agents, including individual taxpayers and a tax authority. It incorporates heterogeneous preferences and income endowments among taxpayers, captured through a utility function that considers psychic costs subtracted from expected pecuniary utility. These costs include moral, reciprocity, and stigma costs associated with norm violations, leading to variations in taxpayers’ risk attitudes and related parameters. The tax authority’s attributes, such as the frequency of random audits, penalty rate, and the choice between partial or full disclosure, remain fixed throughout the simulation. Income endowments and preference parameters are randomly assigned to taxpayers at the outset.

Taxpayers maximize their expected utility by reporting income, taking into account tax, penalty, and audit rates. They make annual decisions based on their own and their peers’ behaviors from the previous year. Taxpayers indirectly interact at the societal level through public disclosure conducted by the tax authority, exchanging tax information among peers. Each period in the simulation collects data on total reported income, average compliance rates per income group, distribution of compliance rates, counts of compliers, full evaders, partial evaders, and the numbers of taxpayers experiencing guilt and anger. The model evaluates whether public disclosure positively or negatively impacts compliance rates and quantifies this impact based on aggregated individual reporting behaviors.

MASTOC-LLM extends the classic Multi-Agent System Tragedy of the Commons (MASTOC) model by replacing hard-coded behavioral rules with autonomous decision-making powered by large language models (LLMs). Three heterogeneous agents manage herds of cows on a shared grassland commons. Each tick, an agent receives a structured prompt describing current resource levels, its own herd size, peer behavior, and — optionally — a rolling memory of recent rounds and messages from neighboring agents. The LLM returns a stocking decision (add, remove, or hold cows) together with a natural-language rationale and, when communication is enabled, a short message to broadcast to peers.

The model is designed to test whether LLM agents spontaneously develop Ostrom-style common-pool resource governance (mutual monitoring, graduated sanctions, graduated rule revision) or instead fall into identifiable failure modes. Preliminary experiments with Claude Haiku 4.5, GPT-5.4-mini, and DeepSeek R1:32b have revealed four recurring collapse patterns — Cooperative Paralysis, Defection Cascade, Overshoot-Panic, and Hybrid Architecture Failure — whose onset timing is sensitive to memory length, inter-agent communication, and the post-training alignment approach of the underlying model.

MASTOC-LLM is intended as a laboratory for generative agent-based modelling (GABM) methodology: it provides a clean, well-understood commons baseline against which LLM behavioral hypotheses can be systematically tested and compared across models, parameter sweeps, and alignment regimes.