This model extends Schelling’s segregation model with mobility sharing. Agents of two groups occupy cells of a 32 × 32 grid and repeatedly choose activity destinations subject to a preference threshold, the minimum share of ingroup neighbours they accept. Trips are matched into shared rides between members of different groups, using one of four matching algorithms on a shareability network (maximal cross-group matching, maximum weight matching on contact time, maximum cardinality matching, or random greedy matching) with a maximum detour constraint. After each trip, an agent’s preference threshold changes with the time spent in contact with outgroup members.

Starting from complete segregation, the model examines under which conditions contact during shared trips leads to integration. Besides the main scenario, in which contact always lowers the threshold, it includes two extensions. In the first, a share of adversarial agents becomes less tolerant with contact, and this share grows or shrinks with the current level of segregation, governed by a branching dissimilarity index and a conversion rate. In the second, each contact raises or lowers the threshold with a probability that depends on the agent’s current attitude relative to a compatibility threshold.

Segregation is measured with the index of dissimilarity and the Gini coefficient. The model file includes BehaviorSpace experiments for each analysis in the associated article. The matching step uses the NetworkX library through the Python extension of NetLogo (requires Python 3 with numpy and networkx 3.x).

This model represents individuals from two different groups interacting and sharing attitudes toward both groups. Through these interactions, individuals adjust their attitudes, which can lead to different outcomes in opinion dynamics. The model can study both intra-group and inter-group opinion dynamics. Under certain conditions, agents with initially moderate attitudes might enter a negative spiral, leading to increasingly extreme intergroup attitudes. Alternatively, these moderate attitudes can foster consensus between groups, resulting in agreement on intergroup attitudes. This model serves as a tool for exploring opinion polarization, particularly in contexts where attitudes evolve through interaction rather than remaining static.

By adjusting different parameters, one can examine the effects of variations in attitude distributions; group size and relative group size; contributions of xenophobia, opinion distance, and individual attitudes towards the outgroup; as well as ratio between xenophobia and attitudinal bias to the overall intergroup bias.

The model accompanies the paper When contact backfires, and when it does not: A computational model of the opinion dynamics of intergroup attitudes.

This repository contains a Python simulation script for studying network-based linguistic diversity. The model extends the classic Greenberg Diversity Index by introducing diversity measures defined over social ties rather than only over population shares. It also includes two extensions: a competence-conditioned version and a multilayer version.

HOSS(-5) is an exploratory agent-based prototype of a small artificial society, written in Python. Each agent is a “ph” (punto humano, “human point”) that is born, is educated, works, consumes and dies. Its yearly decisions depend on a psychological profile (archetype × character), its economic status and its intentionality. Agents interact indirectly through families, firms in 10 sectors, a labour market with about 200 job categories, and a State that provides public services, employment and a Universal Basic Income, adjusting taxes and UBI each year to seek fiscal balance.

The model simulates a few thousand agents over decades of virtual time and records yearly aggregates (population, GDP, income, Gini index, HDI). A separate analysis script explores the results and fits Gamma distributions to individual incomes, comparing the shape parameter with Gini and HDI.

HOSS does not aim to predict real societies or claim empirical validation. It is a sandbox for comparing scenarios and thinking about the organizational design of society from an engineering perspective. Known limitations: no direct social relations between agents, prices and production follow simple rules rather than supply-demand dynamics, and organizations are black boxes.

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Replication package for a network diffusion model of how Protestant belief spreads through a
signed social network, used to compare three versions of balance theory.

Artificial Anasazi is an agent-based model of farming households in the Long House Valley, Arizona, from 800 to 1350 CE. Each household chooses where to farm and settle based on expected harvest, water sources and stored maize, and simulated household counts are compared with the archaeological record.

This release adapts the NetLogo Models Library version (Stonedahl & Wilensky 2010) of Janssen’s (2009) NetLogo replication of the original Ascape model (Dean et al. 2000; Axtell et al. 2002). It contains four configurations in one NetLogo 7.0.4 file, selected with two switches:

• Both switches off: the baseline, which is the Models Library model with small fixes that make it work as intended (the arable-uplands zone name, the setup base yield, the initial household count, one-tick-lag capacity reporting, and seed control with observation-only instruments).
• soil-on?: dynamic soil quality that depletes under cultivation and regrows, following Janssen (2010, eq. 4).
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An agent-based model in which fourteen European Union member states each carry a cooperation
propensity in [0,1], updated by a logistic link applied to a latent index that combines the unit’s
own previous state, a weighted average of the other units’ states, and four min-max normalised
exogenous indicators (cooperative benefit, opportunistic temptation, systemic exit cost,
intertemporal confidence). The logistic centres are anchored so that the observed 2024
configuration is an exact fixed point of the baseline map, the device that makes such models
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Norms@Risk ABM aim is to develop an explanation for the conditions under which people jointly take action to prevent disasters from happening, e.g. impacts from climate crisis, pandemic. The aim of the Norms@Risk work is to explore understudied dynamics between risk, social norms and cooperative behaviour and their role in overcoming collective threats. More specifically, Norms@Risk seeks to refine existing theory on cooperation by unpacking the role of collective risk interacting with social norms in ‘Collective Risk Social Dilemmas’*.

This simulation study takes on the next scientific iteration after a series of behavioural experiments. With the model we target to refine existing theory by capturing the heterogeneity in contributions that existing theories cannot fully explain as the behavioural responses are assumed to be more homogenous, particularly diversity regarding sensitivity to risk and norms.

*Collective Risk Social Dilemmas reflect a special type of social dilemma, unlike typical public goods, the collective risk dilemma involves individual contribution not to realise a gain, but to avoid a collective loss.

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Organizations operate under conditions of imperfect performance in which human error is inevitable, yet errors are rarely examined as the triggers for the managerial interactions that shape organizational culture over time. The present research introduces an agent-based simulation of a work team completing a fixed sequence of tasks under varying degrees of managerial oversight and response policy. The model isolates the mechanical loss of throughput caused by errors from the psychological and cultural consequences of managerial reactions, which are categorized into ignoring, correcting or punishing. Furthermore, the model incorporates an autonomous self-notice mechanism, allowing workers to correct themselves in the absence of managerial intervention. By tracking the accumulation of worker resentment and the transient enhancements in learning, the simulation acts as a dynamic laboratory for observing delayed consequences, nonlinear tipping points and systemic organizational collapse. The results reveal a central paradox of organizational control. Highly monitored punitive environments generate high short-term throughput, yet they simultaneously accumulate interactional injustice and resentment that engineer a rapid cascading turnover and the highest probability of systemic collapse. Conversely, corrective policies combined with active monitoring achieve equivalent throughput while sustaining workforce viability. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis establishes that error accumulation is primarily determined by structural factors, namely agent-level mistake propensity and task difficulty, while resignation dynamics, resentment accumulation and collapse timing remain predominantly governed by managerial policy, a hierarchy independently corroborated by a surrogate model and shown to be stable across independent seeds and across stakeholder weighting scenarios. The study bridges the operational mechanics of task completion and the social dynamics of workplace mistreatment, illustrating how short-term punitive success often masks long-term structural fragility.

Agent-based model of cooperation among fourteen EU member states under geopolitical shocks, 2024-2040. States are adaptive agents on the observed intra-EU trade network, updating a cooperation propensity through inertia, network influence, and a repeated-game payoff structure built from verified Eurostat, Eurobarometer and IMF data. An anchoring device makes the observed 2024 configuration exactly stationary absent shocks, so results are read as deviations from an empirical baseline. Five scenarios of increasing severity are simulated with Monte Carlo replication, up to an extreme counterfactual crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Includes six robustness batteries and a full ODD description.