The NMC model allows exploring how land use competition may be constrained by social structure and dynamics, according to which individual stakeholders compete and cooperate depending on adscription to social groups.
The NMC model also enables to test the effects of two particular modalities of cooperative mechanisms: land use pairing, the awarding, in terms of productivity, of any direct collaboration between farming and herding within a group; and group management, the prerogative of a group leadership to manage individual stakeholders in order to pursue a particular proportion between farming and herding.
Lastly, the model allows assessing the effects of these mechanisms under either open or restricted access to pasture regimes.
Change log v.6:
-The seed of the random number generator can now be controlled, allowing for reproducible simulations.
Change log v.7:
-Corrects the “division by zero error” that exceptionally happened during the procedure resolve-competition (when both defender and contender have zero support).
-Competition counters are modified in the expansion procedures, instead of in check-competitions.
-The consequences, in terms of event counters, of the success of contenders during resolve-competition are simplified.
-When using typeOfExperiment=”defined by expNumber”, the seed is now randomized. Forcing a particular seed can still be done by adding it an additional line in load-experiment procedure.
-More detailed notes were added to the interface.
-The “land use proportion” display shows land not used as brown patches (not yellow as before).
|Version||Submitter||First published||Last modified||Status|
|1.4.0||Andreas Angourakis||Fri Nov 17 10:20:29 2017||Fri Nov 17 10:20:29 2017||Published|
|1.3.0||Andreas Angourakis||Wed Mar 9 19:03:35 2016||Wed Mar 9 19:03:35 2016||Published|
|1.2.0||Andreas Angourakis||Wed Mar 9 16:01:42 2016||Wed Mar 9 16:01:42 2016||Published|
|1.1.0||Andreas Angourakis||Wed Mar 9 12:08:43 2016||Wed Mar 9 12:08:43 2016||Published|
|1.0.0||Andreas Angourakis||Fri Feb 5 17:23:29 2016||Fri Feb 5 17:23:29 2016||Published|