SMILI-T is a model for exploring under which conditions fishing cooperatives can establish and persist in a small-scale fishing community presently dominated by fishers working under fish buyers (so called patron-client relationships; PCs).
The goal of this model is to try to identify the mechanism and conditions under which top-down interventions can support transformations towards cooperative governance arrangements in a fishery. The model has different types of interventions and contrasts financial subsidies (icap, cap) with social interventions (iloy, loy), where the latter is aimed at increasing loyalty between fishers in a coopertive. The aim is to investigate their effectiveness under different social and ecological conditions (different levels of conflict scenario and in different fishing environments).
The model is used for examining how external interventions interplay with the internal self-organizing dynamics of the fishery resulting in the establishment or disappearance of cooperatives. The model focuses on the critical moment when the cooperative is introduced and has to successfully establish against the dominant form of self-governance, herein patron-client relationships.
Model associated with the publication “Schlüter, Maja, Emilie Lindkvist, and Xavier Basurto. 2021. “The Interplay between Top-down Interventions and Bottom-up Self-Organization Shapes Opportunities for Transforming Self-Governance in Small-Scale Fisheries.” Marine Policy 104485. doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104485.”