Dynamic bipartite network model of agents and games in which agents are either cooperators or defectors and can participate in multiple public goods games. Examines multiple institutions for maintaining cooperation: capacity constraints, cognitive constraints, reputational exclusion.
Used by two papers:
[1] Smaldino PE, Lubell M (2011) An institutional mechanism for assortment in an ecology of games. PLOS ONE 6(8): e23019.
[2] Smaldino PE, Lubell M (2014) Institutions and cooperation in an ecology of games. Artificial Life 20: 207–221.
Version | Submitter | First published | Last modified | Status |
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1.0.0 | Paul Smaldino | Wed Nov 29 00:31:40 2017 | Wed Nov 29 00:31:40 2017 | Published |