Computational Model Library

Evolution of Cooperation in Asymmetric Commons Dilemmas

This model can be used to explore under which conditions agents behave as observed in field experiments on irrigation games. In irrigation games participants have different levels of access to the resource. This asymmetry causes that agents downstream reduce investment in the common infrastructure if they do not get a large enough share of the common pool. Participants balance efficiency and equity. When do agents evolve who do the same?

Release Notes

Updated for Netlogo 5.0

irrigationgame_v4.1_interface.png
Version Submitter First published Last modified Status
1.1.0 Marco Janssen Fri Nov 16 17:33:05 2012 Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013 Published Peer Reviewed
1.0.0 Marco Janssen Fri Aug 20 18:41:16 2010 Sat Apr 27 20:18:30 2013 Published Peer Reviewed

Discussion

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