Quantitative Economy

Researcher in sustainable production and consumption, the service economy, energy markets, and electricity balancing mechanisms.

My research centers on isolating how and to what extent political institutions themselves shape policy. I use computational modeling (agent-based and simulation) to gain theoretical leverage on the issue. This approach allows me to place groups of actors with given preferences into different institutional settings in order to gauge the effect of the rules of the game on political outcomes. Most of my research examines the ways in which legislative processes affect issues of political economy, such as income redistribution.

My interests lie in the areas of market structure, macroprudential and microprudential policies and their interactions, international macroeconomics, political economy, international financial integration, banking, and systemic risk.

Matteo Richiardi is an internationally recognised scholar in  micro-simulation modelling (this includes dynamic microsimulations and agent-based modelling). His work on micro-simulations involves both methodological research on estimation and validation techniques, and applications to the analysis of distributional outcomes, the functioning of the labour market and welfare systems. He is Chief Editor of the International Journal of Microsimulation. Examples of his work are the two recent books “Elements of Agent-based Computational Economics”, published by Cambridge University Press (2016), and “The political economy of work security and flexibility: Italy in comparative perspective”, published by Policy Press (2012).

Agent-based modeling, Participatory modeling, Socio-technical systems, Complexity, Sustainability, Circular Economy, Design Science, Action research.

My interests lie in the intersection of economics, networks, and computation. I am currently studying labour dynamics as a process where people flow throughout the economy by moving from one firm to another. I study these flows by looking at detailed data about employment histories of each individual and every firm in entire economies. Using this information, I construct networks of firms in order to map the roads that people take throughout their careers. This allows to study labour markets at an unprecedented fine-grained level of detail. I employ agent-based computing methods to understand how economic shocks and policies alter labour flows, which eventually translate into unemployment and other related problems.

Two themes unite my research: a commitment to methodological creativity and innovation as expressed in my work with computational social sciences, and an interest in the political economy of “globalization,” particularly its implications for the ontological claims of international relations theory.

I have demonstrated how the methods of computational social sciences can model bargaining and social choice problems for which traditional game theory has found only indeterminate and multiple equilibria. My June 2008 article in International Studies Quarterly (“Coordination in Large Numbers,” vol. 52, no. 2) illustrates that, contrary to the expectation of collective action theory, large groups may enjoy informational advantages that allow players with incomplete information to solve difficult three-choice coordination games. I extend this analysis in my 2009 paper at the International Studies Association annual convention, in which I apply ideas from evolutionary game theory to model learning processes among players faced with coordination and commitment problems. Currently I am extending this research to include social network theory as a means of modeling explicitly the patterns of interaction in large-n (i.e. greater than two) player coordination and cooperation games. I argue in my paper at the 2009 American Political Science Association annual convention that computational social science—the synthesis of agent-based modeling, social network analysis and evolutionary game theory—empowers scholars to analyze a broad range of previously indeterminate bargaining problems. I also argue this synthesis gives researchers purchase on two of the central debates in international political economy scholarship. By modeling explicitly processes of preference formation, computational social science moves beyond the rational actor model and endogenizes the processes of learning that constructivists have identified as essential to understanding change in the international system. This focus on the micro foundations of international political economy in turn allows researchers to understand how social structural features emerge and constrain actor choices. Computational social science thus allows IPE to formalize and generalize our understandings of mutual constitution and systemic change, an observation that explains the paradoxical interest of constructivists like Ian Lustick and Matthew Hoffmann in the formal methods of computational social science. Currently I am writing a manuscript that develops these ideas and applies them to several challenges of globalization: developing institutions to manage common pool resources; reforming capital adequacy standards for banks; and understanding cascading failures in global networks.

While computational social science increasingly informs my research, I have also contributed to debates about the epistemological claims of computational social science. My chapter with James N. Rosenau in Complexity in World Politics (ed. by Neil E. Harrison, SUNY Press 2006) argues that agent-based modeling suffers from underdeveloped and hidden epistemological and ontological commitments. On a more light-hearted note, my article in PS: Political Science and Politics (“Clocks, Not Dartboards,” vol. 39, no. 3, July 2006) discusses problems with pseudo-random number generators and illustrates how they can surprise unsuspecting teachers and researchers.