Computational Model Library

Communication and Trust in a Commons Dilemma Experiment (version 1.0.0)

An agent model is presented that aims to capture the impact of cheap talk on collective action in a commons dilemma. The commons dilemma is represented as a spatially explicit renewable resource. Agent’s trust in others impacts the speed and harvesting rate, and trust is impacted by observed harvesting behavior and cheap talk. We calibrated the model using experimental data (DeCaro et al. 2021). The best fit to the data consists of a population with a small frequency of altruistic and selfish agents, and mostly conditional cooperative agents sensitive to inequality and cheap talk. This calibrated model provides an empirical test of the behavioral theory of collective action of Elinor Ostrom and Humanistic Rational Choice Theory.

Release Notes

This model runs without any input files. It has been used with BehaviorSearch to calibrate with experimental data

Version Submitter First published Last modified Status
1.0.0 Marco Janssen Sun Oct 2 17:10:34 2022 Sun Oct 2 17:10:34 2022 Published


This website uses cookies and Google Analytics to help us track user engagement and improve our site. If you'd like to know more information about what data we collect and why, please see our data privacy policy. If you continue to use this site, you consent to our use of cookies.