Computational Model Library

This is a set of threshold public goods games models. Set consists of baseline model, endogenous shared punishment model, endogenous shared punishment model with activists and cooperation model. In each round, all agents are granted a budget of size set in GUI. Then they decide on how much they contribute to public goods and how much they keep. Public goods are provided only if the sum of contributions meets or exceeds the threshold defined in the GUI. After each round agents evaluate their strategy and payoff from this strategy.

Peer reviewed Evolution of Sex

Kristin Crouse | Published Sun Jun 5 08:24:01 2016 | Last modified Thu Feb 20 22:54:34 2020

Evolution of Sex is a NetLogo model that illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of sexual and asexual reproductive strategies. It seeks to demonstrate the answer to the question “Why do we have sex?”

Governing the commons

Marco Janssen | Published Tue Jan 14 17:12:29 2020

Model on the use of shared renewable resources including impact of imitation via success-bias and altruistic punishment.
The model is discussed in Introduction to Agent-Based Modeling by Marco Janssen. For more information see

Cultural Group Selection of Sustainable Institutions

Timothy Waring Sandra H Goff Paul Smaldino | Published Wed Jun 10 17:38:06 2015 | Last modified Tue Aug 4 14:14:05 2015

We develop a spatial, evolutionary model of the endogenous formation and dissolution of groups using a renewable common pool resource. We use this foundation to measure the evolutionary pressures at different organizational levels.

Evolution of altruistic punishment

Marco Janssen | Published Wed Sep 3 21:01:26 2008 | Last modified Sat Mar 9 01:22:54 2019

In the model agents make decisions to contribute of not to the public good of a group, and cooperators may punish, at a cost, defectors. The model is based on group selection, and is used to understan

Spatial model of the noisy Prisoner's Dilemma with reward shift

Matus Halas | Published Thu Mar 5 16:17:54 2015 | Last modified Tue May 29 09:09:01 2018

Interactions of players embedded in a closed square lattice are determined by distance and overall gains and they lead to shifts of reward payoff between temptation and punishment. A new winner balancing against threats is ultimately discovered.

I model a forest and a community of loggers. Agents follow different kinds of rules in order to log. I compare the impact of endogenous and of exogenous institutions on the state of the forest and on the profit of the users, representing different scenarios of participatory conservation projects.

A simple Multi-Agent System of the Tragedy Of the Commons (MASTOC-s)

Julia Schindler | Published Fri Jun 29 13:39:10 2012 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:19 2013

This is a simple model replicating Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons using reactive agents that have psychological behavioral and social preferences.

Evolution of Conditional Cooperation

Marco Janssen Miles Manning Oyita Udiani | Published Thu Aug 1 04:03:07 2013 | Last modified Fri Dec 6 05:35:19 2013

Cultural group selection model used to evaluate the conditions for agents to evolve who have other-regarding preferences in making decisions in public good games.

cultural group and persistent parochialism

Jae-Woo Kim | Published Mon Nov 8 06:23:12 2010 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:28 2013

Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in

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