Jorge is a PhD candidate of System Design Engineering at the University of Waterloo. His research activities are focused on applying agent-based models on three major areas: 1) financial markets to study the self-regulation capability of artificial markets with interacting investors and credit rating agencies; 2) the efficiency of road networks when users have access to real-time information and are able to adjust their behavior to current conditions; 3) failure probability of nuclear waste containers due to microbial- and chemical-driven corrosion.
I am a developer for CoMSES Net as part of the Global Biosocial Complexity Initiative at Arizona State University. I work on improving model reuse, accessibility and discoverability through the development of the comses.net website and the CoMSES bibliographic database (catalog.comses.net). I also provide data analysis and software development advice on coupling models, version control, dependency management and data analysis to researchers and modelers.
My interests include model componentization, statistics, data analysis and improving model development and resuability practices.
I am a cognitive and behavioural economist, heterodox economist and postdoctoral researcher at the University of CHIETI-PESCARA, Italy. Before this, I worked at Procter & Gamble.I hold a PhD in the Human Science curriculum in Economics and Statistics from the University of CHIETI-PESCARA, and an MS in management, finance and development from the University of CHIETI-PESCARA.
I am also a board member of the Society of Experimental Finance and the Italian Post-Keynesian Society.
In my spare time, I enjoy travel, reading, jogging, and coding.
ABM
Modelling
Behavioural modelling
Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Bounded Rationality
performance of urban water service provision, high levels of inequities and inefficiency persist. In terms of water distribution and cost, these undesirable patterns have a high impact on peri-urban areas usually populated by marginalized and poor populations. The high levels of Non-Revenue Water (NRW), together with the existence of corrupt practices and mismanagement of water utilities, remain a highly controversial issue.
This situation confronts rent-seeking theory directly, explaining the performance-corruption relationship (Repetto, 1986). The presumption is that low performance in water supply service provision results from corruption because rent-seeking occurs. Hence, the implementation of performance-oriented reforms in the water supply sector, such as regulation or private sector participation, will reduce corruption, increasing the efficiency of water service provision. Nevertheless, latest evidence shows that “key elements of good political governance have a positive effect on the access to water services in developing countries. In turn, private sector participation has little influence other than increasing internal efficiency of water providers” (Krausse, 2009).
Indeed the relation between governance, corruption and performance seems to be more complex than theory wants to acknowledge. It must be reviewed further than a simple cause-effect relationship. It appears that poor management of water utilities, evidenced by high levels of NRW, justifies new investments. Such practices can be encouraged by an “opportunistic management”, whilst at the same time maintaining an influential “hydrocratic elite” in the sphere of water control.
The present research proposal aims to understand the relation between mismanagement and corruption of water control practices in water supply service provision. The research examines how this relationship affects the performance of water service provision and relates to water supply governance models at municipal peri-urban level in three African countries.
To understand the mismanagement-corruption relationship, we look at different case studies of water supply service provision in Senegal, Ghana and Kenya. Each case represents a different governance model in terms of management practices, institutional and organizational settings, and the actors in place, which affects the performance of water service provision in terms of allocative efficiency and access to water (equity). Whether regulation, decentralization and private sector participation constitute possible ways to reduce corruption is examined in the context of water sector reform.
In a second step, we propose a theoretical model based on Agent Based Modelling (ABM) (Pahl-Wostl, 2007) to reproduce complex social networks under a Socio-Ecological System (SES) framework approach. The model will allow us to test whether collaborative governance in the form of collective action in a participatory and negotiated decision-making process for water control, can reduce corruption and increase performance.
The present research benefits from the project “Transparency and Integrity in Service Delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa”. This project, carried out by Transparency International (TI) in 8 Sub-Saharan countries, aims to increase access to education, health and water by improving transparency and integrity in basic service delivery. The proposal retains focus on Senegal, Ghana and Kenya in the water sector.
Key words: water control, mismanagement, corruption, performance, collaborative governance, modelling, collective action, negotiation, participation