This model is to simulate and compare the admission effects of 3 school matching mechanisms, serial dictatorship, Boston mechanism, and Chinese Parallel, under different settings of information released.

The model is to understand how the following matching mechanisms affect educational opportunity and school quality: Serial dictatorship, deferred acceptance, the Boston mechanism, the Chinese parallel mechanism, and the Taipei mechanism.

We evaluate the performance of different admission systems characterized by two essential features: first, the submission deadline, either before or after the exam score is known second, the number of submittable choices, from tight to loose.

This model is to match students and schools using real-world student admission mechanisms. The mechanisms in this model are serial dictatorship, deferred acceptance, the Boston mechanism, Chinese Parallel, and the Taipei mechanism.

We evaluate the performance of different admission systems characterized by two essential features: first, the submission deadline, either before or after the exam score is known second, the number of submittable choices, from tight to loose.

This model is to simulate and compare the admission effects of 3 school matching mechanisms, serial dictatorship, Boston mechanism, and Chinese Parallel, under different settings of information released.

We evaluate the performance of different admission systems characterized by two essential features: first, the submission deadline, either before or after the exam score is known second, the number of submittable choices, from tight to loose.