Community

Fernando Galeana Member since: Tuesday, October 08, 2013

M.A. in International Development

I am a first year PhD student interested in applying ABM to understand the effect of formalizing property rights on the governance of land and natural resources.

Bryann Avendaño Member since: Monday, June 29, 2015

B.Sc. Biologist, B.Sc. Ecologist, D.pl. Applied Statistics and Systems Dynamic Modelling

Ecology - Natural Resources Management (Community-based management)

I worked on natural resources management modelling in STELLA. I developed a technical and scientific model to analyze soil, climate and biological conditions to explain how Bamboo ecosystem works and how people in Cundinamarca, Colombia could focus on a sustainable model for use and manage forestry resources.
Also, I worked on the seventh framework program named: Community-based management of Environmental Challenges in Latin America -COMET-LA-. The project built a learning arena with scientists, civil society and government to identify sustainable models for governance of natural resources in social-ecological systems located in a rural context from Colombia, México and Argentina.

I am interesting in research on Modelling of governance and Community-based management of natural resources.

Julen Gonzalez Member since: Thursday, September 17, 2015

BSc in Environmental Sciences, University of the Basque Country, UK, MSc in Sustainable Development, University of St Andrews, UK

My research interests stand between natural resource management and ecological economics. The aim of my PhD project responds to the increasing demand for cross-disciplinary agent-based models that examine the disjunction between economic growth and more sustainable use of natural resources.

My research attempts to test the effectiveness of different governance and economic frameworks on managing natural resources sustainably at both regional and national levels. The goal is to simulate how communities and institutions manage the commons in complex socio-ecological systems through several case-studies, e.g. rainforest management in Australia. It is hoped that the models will highlight which combination of variables lead to positive trends in both economic and environmental indicators, which could stimulate more sustainable practices by governments, private sectors and civil society.

Shaheen Abdulkareem Member since: Tuesday, August 15, 2017

MSc

Fabian Adelt Member since: Monday, November 20, 2017

Computer Studies, Diploma-Degree

Fabian Adelt graduated in computer-sciences with a minor in sociology of technology (degree: Diplom-Informatiker) at TU Dortmund University in 2011. Currently, he is research fellow at the Technology Studies Group and involved in the project “Collaborative Data- and Risk-Management in Future Grids – A Simulation Study” (KoRiSim). Between 2012 and 2015 he worked on the project “Mixed Modes of Governance as a Means of Risk Management in Complex Systems” (RiskSim). His research interests entail agent-based modelling and simulating of socio-technical systems, especially focussing on governance issues and actors’ reactions on interventions. Experience covers the fields of mobility and energy.

Geerten Hengeveld Member since: Thursday, January 24, 2019 Full Member

Wageningen University & Research
Currently researcher modelling at Biometris, Wageningen University & Research

modelling,
ecology, foraging, forestry, forest management, water management
scenario analysis
agent based modelling
individual based modelling
model quality, model evaluation, model governance

Francesc Bellaubi Member since: Thursday, June 27, 2013

PhD candidate

performance of urban water service provision, high levels of inequities and inefficiency persist. In terms of water distribution and cost, these undesirable patterns have a high impact on peri-urban areas usually populated by marginalized and poor populations. The high levels of Non-Revenue Water (NRW), together with the existence of corrupt practices and mismanagement of water utilities, remain a highly controversial issue.

This situation confronts rent-seeking theory directly, explaining the performance-corruption relationship (Repetto, 1986). The presumption is that low performance in water supply service provision results from corruption because rent-seeking occurs. Hence, the implementation of performance-oriented reforms in the water supply sector, such as regulation or private sector participation, will reduce corruption, increasing the efficiency of water service provision. Nevertheless, latest evidence shows that “key elements of good political governance have a positive effect on the access to water services in developing countries. In turn, private sector participation has little influence other than increasing internal efficiency of water providers” (Krausse, 2009).

Indeed the relation between governance, corruption and performance seems to be more complex than theory wants to acknowledge. It must be reviewed further than a simple cause-effect relationship. It appears that poor management of water utilities, evidenced by high levels of NRW, justifies new investments. Such practices can be encouraged by an “opportunistic management”, whilst at the same time maintaining an influential “hydrocratic elite” in the sphere of water control.

The present research proposal aims to understand the relation between mismanagement and corruption of water control practices in water supply service provision. The research examines how this relationship affects the performance of water service provision and relates to water supply governance models at municipal peri-urban level in three African countries.

To understand the mismanagement-corruption relationship, we look at different case studies of water supply service provision in Senegal, Ghana and Kenya. Each case represents a different governance model in terms of management practices, institutional and organizational settings, and the actors in place, which affects the performance of water service provision in terms of allocative efficiency and access to water (equity). Whether regulation, decentralization and private sector participation constitute possible ways to reduce corruption is examined in the context of water sector reform.

In a second step, we propose a theoretical model based on Agent Based Modelling (ABM) (Pahl-Wostl, 2007) to reproduce complex social networks under a Socio-Ecological System (SES) framework approach. The model will allow us to test whether collaborative governance in the form of collective action in a participatory and negotiated decision-making process for water control, can reduce corruption and increase performance.

The present research benefits from the project “Transparency and Integrity in Service Delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa”. This project, carried out by Transparency International (TI) in 8 Sub-Saharan countries, aims to increase access to education, health and water by improving transparency and integrity in basic service delivery. The proposal retains focus on Senegal, Ghana and Kenya in the water sector.

Key words: water control, mismanagement, corruption, performance, collaborative governance, modelling, collective action, negotiation, participation

Pedro Phelipe Gonçalves Porto Member since: Thursday, March 21, 2019

Environmental Engineer
Msc - Environmental Technology and Water Resources

Water management, water resources, environment, natural resources, hydrology, hydraulics

Human Resources Member since: Monday, July 20, 2020 Full Member

John Janmaat Member since: Thursday, April 17, 2014

Ph.D. in Economics, MBA in Finance, M.Sc. in Agricultural Economics, B.Sc. in Agricultural Economics

Water resource economics, natural resource economics, environmental economics, ecological economic modeling, ecological economics, environmental policy, development economics.

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