Using nodes from the 2002 General Social Survey sample, the code establishes a network of ties with a given homophily bias, and simulates Internet adoption rates in that network under three conditions: (i) no network externalities, (ii) general network externalities, where an individual’s reservation price is a function of the overall adoption rate in the network, (iii) specific network externalities, where reservation price is a function of the adoption rate in individual’s personal network, with varying degrees of homophily.
Detailed description is available in:
Paul DiMaggio and Filiz Garip. 2011. “How Network Externalities Can Exacerbate Intergroup Inequality.” American Journal of Sociology 116(6): 1887-1933.
|Version||Submitter||First published||Last modified||Status|
|1.1.0||Filiz Garip||Fri Apr 27 21:07:06 2012||Sat Apr 27 20:18:23 2013||Published|
|1.0.0||Filiz Garip||Fri Apr 27 20:56:06 2012||Sat Apr 27 20:18:21 2013||Published|