CoMSES Net maintains cyberinfrastructure to foster FAIR data principles for access to and (re)use of computational models. Model authors can publish their model code in the Computational Model Library with documentation, metadata, and data dependencies and support these FAIR data principles as well as best practices for software citation. Model authors can also request that their model code be peer reviewed to receive a DOI. All users of models published in the library must cite model authors when they use and benefit from their code.
CoMSES Net also maintains a curated database of over 7500 publications of agent-based and individual based models with additional metadata on availability of code and bibliometric information on the landscape of ABM/IBM publications that we welcome you to explore.
The simulation generates two kinds of agents, whose proposals are generated accordingly to their selfish or selfless behaviour. Then, agents compete in order to increase their portfolio playing the ultimatum game with a random-stranger matching.
In the context switching model, a society of agents embedded in multiple social relations, engages in a simple abstract game: the consensus game. Each agent has to choose towards one of two possible choices which are basically arbitrary. The objective of the game is to reach a global consensus, but the particular choice that gets collectively selected is irrelevant.
An agent-based framework that aggregates social network-level individual interactions to run targeting and rewarding programs for a freemium social app. Git source code in https://bitbucket.org/mchserrano/socialdynamicsfreemiumapps
This model is an agent-based simulation that consists of agents who play the spatial prisioner’s dilemma game with coalition formation. The coalition dynamics are mainly influenced by how much the agents trust their leaders. The main objective is provide a simulation model to enable the analysis of the impacts that the use of trust may cause in coalition formation.
We present an agent-based model of worker protest informed by Epstein (2002). Workers have varying degrees of grievance depending on the difference between their wage and the average of their neighbors. They protest with probabilities proportional to grievance, but are inhibited by the risk of being arrested – which is determined by the ratio of coercive agents to probable rebels in the local area. We explore the effect of similarity perception on the dynamics of collective behavior. If […]
The model explores the possibility of the evolution of cooperation due to indirect reciprocity when agents derive information about the past behavior of the opponent in one-shot dilemma games.
This simulates the evolution of rules of shedding games based on cultural group selection. A number of groups play shedding games and evaluate the consequences on the average length and the difficulty
A special case of the model ‘huntingforestry’, where a ‘pulsar’ pattern emerges, balancing hunting and game population growth.
This is the R code of the mathematical model used for verification. This code corresponds to equations 1-9, 15-53, 58-62, 69-70, and 72-75 given in the paper “A Mathematical Model of The Beer Game”.