Computational Model Library

Takács, K. and Squazzoni, F. 2015. High Standards Enhance Inequality in Idealized Labor Markets. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 18(4), 2, http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/18/4/2.html
We built a simple model of an idealized labor market, in which there is no objective difference in average quality between groups and hiring decisions are not biased in favor of any particular group. Our results show that inequality in employment emerges necessarily also in such idealized situations due to the limited supply of high quality individuals and asymmetric information. Inequalities are exacerbated when employers have high standards and keep only the best workers in house. We found that ambitious workers get higher quality jobs even if ambition does not correlate or even negatively correlates with internal quality. Our findings help to corroborate empirical findings on higher employment discrepancies in high rather than low status jobs.

Effect of communication in irrigation games

Marco Janssen Jacopo Baggio | Published Wed Jan 14 04:08:32 2015 | Last modified Wed Aug 9 01:28:22 2017

The model includes different formulations how agents make decisions in irrigation games and this is compared with empirical data. The aim is to test different theoretical models, especially explaining effect of communication.

THE STATUS ARENA

Gert Jan Hofstede Jillian Student Mark R Kramer | Published Wed Jun 8 13:27:12 2016 | Last modified Tue Jan 9 19:35:05 2018

Status-power dynamics on a playground, resulting in a status landscape with a gender status gap. Causal: individual (beauty, kindness, power), binary (rough-and-tumble; has-been-nice) or prior popularity (status). Cultural: acceptability of fighting.

This is a stylized model based on Alonso’s model investigating the relationship between urban sprawl and income segregation.

We explore how dynamic processes related to socioeconomic inequality operate to sort students into, and create stratification among, colleges.

An Agent-Based Model of Internet Diffusion Under General and Specific Network Externalities

Filiz Garip | Published Fri Apr 27 20:56:06 2012 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:23 2013

Using nodes from the 2002 General Social Survey sample, the code establishes a network of ties with a given homophily bias, and simulates Internet adoption rates in that network under three conditions: (i) no network externalities, (ii) general network externalities, where an individual’s reservation price is a function of the overall adoption rate in the network, (iii) specific network externalities, where reservation price is a function of the adoption rate in individual’s personal […]

Smallholder Behavioural Decisions During Times of Drought Stress

Samantha Dobbie | Published Sun Sep 15 13:46:42 2013 | Last modified Sat Sep 27 10:35:00 2014

An empirical ABM of smallholder decisions in times of drought stress.

The model explores the emergence of inequality in cognitive and socio-emotional skills at the societal level within and across generations that results from differences in parental investment behavior during childhood and adolescence.

Setting the Stage for Inequality

Timothy Dennehy | Published Mon Mar 11 21:52:57 2013 | Last modified Sat Apr 27 20:18:45 2013

How can a strictly egalitarian social system give way to a stratified society if all of its members punish each other for any type of selfish behavior? This model examines the role of prestige bias in constant and variable environments on the development of hierarchies of wealth.

Aspiration, Attainment and Success: An agent-based model of distance-based school allocation

James Millington | Published Fri Nov 2 16:44:03 2012 | Last modified Fri Jul 3 20:06:01 2015

The purpose of this model is to investigate mechanisms driving the geography of educational inequality and the consequences of these mechanisms for individuals with varying attributes and mobility.

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